Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 47

Issue 3

Article 4

Summer 6-1-1990

The Insider Trading And Securities Fraud Enforcement Act: Has
Congress Supplied A Limitations Period Appropriate For Use In
Private 10B-5 Actions?
David J. Guin
David R. Donaldson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David J. Guin and David R. Donaldson, The Insider Trading And Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act: Has Congress Supplied A Limitations Period Appropriate For Use In Private 10B-5 Actions?,
47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 541 (1990).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol47/iss3/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

THE INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES FRAUD
ENFORCEMENT ACT: HAS CONGRESS SUPPLIED A
LIMITATIONS PERIOD APPROPRIATE FOR USE IN
PRIVATE 10b-5 ACTIONS?
DAvID

DAVID R.

J. GuiT*
DONALDSON**

Because civil actions brought pursuant to section. 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)' and rule lOb-5 2 promulgated thereunder
are judicially implied,3 there is no federal statute of limitations that is
expressly applicable to such actions. Courts traditionally have adopted
limitations periods for lOb-5 actions from state law, 4 but that practice has
given rise to a host of collateral issues that have consumed undue amounts
of judicial energy and resulted in protracted litigation unrelated to the merits
of the actions.
For a number of reasons, adoption of state limitations periods for
federal causes of action has resulted in uncertainty, unpredictability, and a

* Member, Alabama State Bar, 1985. B.S., 1982, David Lipscomb College; J.D., 1985,
University of Alabama School of Law. Mr. Guin is a partner in the Birmingham, Alabama
law firm of Ritchie and Rediker.
** Member, Alabama State Bar, 1980. B.A., University of Alabama-Birmingham; J.D.,
1980, Cumberland School of Law. Mr. Donaldson is a partner in the Birmingham, Alabama
law firm of Ritchie and Rediker.
1. 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
3. The first published opinion recognizing an implied cause of action under rule lob-5
was in Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In the 44
years since that decision, an implied right of action under rule lob-5 has become firmly
entrenched. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) ("It is now established that a private right of action is implied under section 10(b).").
Federal courts also have recognized implied rights of action under §§ 14(a) and (e) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)
(section 14(a)); Florida Commercial Banks v. Culverhouse, 772 F.2d 1513 (lth Cir. 1985)
(section 14(e)). The circuit courts are split on the issue of whether an implied right of action
should exist under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. Compare Stephenson v. Calpine
Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing action); Kirshner v. United States,
603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979) with Landry v. All Am.
Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982) (no implied right of action exists under § 17(a));
Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 ; Shull
v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978). Although this article primarily concerns section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, its analysis
is applicable in large part to these other implied rights of action. Cf. Suslick v. Rothschild
See. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1984) (treating § 17(a) and rule lOb-5 claims
similarly); Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 717 F.2d 105, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1983) (action
under § 14(a) and rule 14a-9; court applied statute of limitations analysis of rule lob-5 cases).
4. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384 n.18 (1983); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976).
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lack of uniformity. Looking to a forum state's limitations period often
entails application of the forum state's choice of law principles' and borrowing statutes6 to determine if the forum would apply its own statutes of
limitation or those of some other state. Once the court decides what state's
limitations periods apply, it must choose from among that state's statutes
to find the period that applies to state law actions that are "most closely

analogous" to the lOb-5 claim being asserted, a subjective process that
frequently leads to confusing and unpredictable results.7 Having decided on

a given period, the court then must decide whether to look to state or
federal law to determine when the applicable period begins to run,' and
what, if any, tolling rules might interrupt the running of the statute.9 The
problems are compounded in complex, nationwide litigation and in multidistrict transfer cases.' 0
This uncertainty has important consequences to both plaintiffs and
defendants. As the Supreme Court recently recognized,
[p]laintiffs may be denied their just remedy if they delay in filing
their claims, having wrongly postulated that the courts would apply

a longer statute. Defendants cannot calculate their contingent liabilities, not knowing with confidence when their delicts lie in repose."
Aside from the delay, inefficiency, and practical difficulties attendant
to the application of state limitations periods, this practice will always suffer
from the inherent problems associated with the use of different limitations

5. Conflict of laws problems have not been extensively litigated in the context of rule
RESTATENM[ENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971)
provides that the limitations period that normally would be applied by the forum is applicable
even if the action would be barred under the law of another appropriate forum, unless the
action in the other forum would have been barred by a statute that barred the right and not
merely the remedy. This principle, combined with the far-reaching venue provisions of the
1934 Act, lends itself to forum shopping. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURMTES LAW HANDBOOK
§ 25.02, at 660 (1988-89 ed.)
6. See Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1977); Jones Found. v. Soros
99,588
Fund Management, Inc., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 562 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Del. 1983). See also
infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
7. In Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979), for example, each
of the three judges orl the panel had a different opinion as to what limitations period was
applicable. One judge held that the forum state's limitations period for common-law fraud
applied. A dissenting judge opined that the state's blue sky limitations period should apply.
The concurring judge stated that in "ordinary circumstances" he would have applied the blue
sky limitations period, but because the blue sky statute did not provide a remedy for defrauded
sellers (as was the situation before the court), he felt compelled to adopt the limitations period
from the fraud statute.
8. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
11. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987) (quoting
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 n. 34 (1985)).

lOb-5 actions. However, § 142 of the
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periods by various courts for a single federal cause of action. As long as
state limitations periods are used, litigants' rights under a federal law
inevitably will vary according to their state of residence or the forum in
which they choose, or are forced, to litigate. Plaintiffs will be encouraged
to utilize the 1934 Act's nationwide service of process and liberal venue
provisions to forum shop, and defendants will be unable to enjoy the
protection from claims that statutes of limitations are designed to provide.
Most courts and commentators that have discussed the policy questions
associated with the application of state limitations periods to 1Ob-5 actions
have harshly criticized the practice' 2 and have suggested a number of
alternatives.' 3 However, years of precedent and differences of opinion about

12. See, e.g., In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 131; Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 943; McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979);
L. Loss, FuNDAMENTAS OF SECURmTS REGULATION 1164-75 (1983); Bloomenthal, The Statute

of Limitations and Rule lob-5: A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 CoLo. L. REv. 235 (1989);
Report of the Task Force on Statutes of Limitationsfor Implied Actions, 41 Bus. LAw. 645
(1986) [hereinafter Task Force Report]; Schulman, Statutes of Limitation in lob-5 Actions:
Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 635 (1967); Comment, Statutes of
Limitations in lob-5 Actions: A Proposalfor CongressionalLegislation, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv.
1154 (1973) [hereinafter Legislation Comment].
Courts and commentators have lambasted the lack of uniformity engendered by adopting
local limitations rules for federal legislation. The traditional approach of adopting state
limitations rules has been described as a "tottering parapet of a ramshackle edifice," Norris,
818 F.2d at 1332, and the resulting lack of uniformity and certainty has been categorized as
chaotic and an untold waste of time "in search of an answer to the wrong question."
Bloomenthal, supra, at 236.
An American Bar Association Task Force stated that application of local limitations
periods to rule lOb-5 claims
has disserved not only the federal courts but litigants, the bar, and the investment
community. As the current chaotic state of the law demonstrates, no state law is
readily applicable to the federal rights sought to be enforced. Furthermore, deference
to state law is not warranted because federal, not state, interests are involved in the
federal courts' creation and application of the implied private right of action under
section 10 and Rule lOb-5.
Task Force Report, supra, at 656. See also L. Loss, supra, at 1168-69; Blume & George,
Limitations and the FederalCourts, 49 MICH. L. REv. 937 (1951); Note, Statutes of Limitations
in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 Aiz. L.J. 97; Note, FederalBorrowing of Arkansas
Statutes of Limitations in Enforcement of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes, 31 ARK.
L. REv. 692 (1978); Note, A Limitation on Actions for Deprivation of Federal Rights, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 68 (1968); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 CoLUM.

L. REv. 68 (1953); Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428 (1960);
Note, Disparitiesin Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 49 YALE L.J. 738 (1940).
13. Some commentators have urged adoption of the limitations periods applicable to the
express negligence or strict liability-based civil liability sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
See, e.g., L. Loss, supra note 12, at 898-900; Bloomentha, supra note 12, at 235. Such
limitations periods generally allow a claim to be filed within one year of discovery (or in some
cases, constructive discovery), but no more than three years after the "sale," "violation," or
"accrual" of the cause of action. The Third Circuit in In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843
F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131, recently adopted its own form of this
one year/three year rule for all lob-5 actions. As discussed herein, the Third Circuit's new
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the best alternative to the traditional rule have prevented the lower courts
from adopting a uniform approach, and
the Supreme Court has repeatedly
4
refused to squarely address the issue.'
The central inquiry in determining what limitations period governs a
federal implied remedy necessarily revolves around congressional intent and,
to some extent, public policy. However, with respect to rule lOb-5 actions,
divining congressional "intent" from legislation predating the recognition
of a private right of action under rule lOb-5 is a dubious exercise at best,
and decisions based on "public policy" invite result-oriented logic that
produces a variety of results. Fortunately, recent federal legislation amending
the 1934 Act contains a clear expression of congressional intent and offers
a previously unavailable alternative to the status quo that better serves the
goals of the 1934 Act and at the same time bars stale claims and promotes
uniformity and certainty. 5 The Supreme Court now should adopt the
recently enacted five year limitations period of section 20A of the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) 6 for the
implied causes of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder.
This article discusses the development of the "traditional rule" of
adopting state limitations periods, the Supreme Court's willingness in certain
circumstances to forsake that rule, and the alternative presented by ITSFEA.

rule conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and the policies behind rule lob-5.
Other commentators have urged new legislation including a statute of limitations modeled
on New York's limitations period, allowing the lesser of two years from constructive discovery
or six years from sale. See

5C

A. JAcoBs, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5, §

235.02 (rev. ed. 1990); Legislation Comment, supra note 12, at 1168-71. Still others have
proposed using the one year/five year limitations period contained in § 1727(b) of the Federal
Securities Code prepared by the American Law Institute. See Block & Barton, Statute of
Limitations in Private Actions Under Section 10(b)-A Proposalfor Achieving Uniformity, 7
SEC. REG. L.J. 374 (1980); Comment, Statutes of Limitations for Rule l0b-5, 39 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1021, 1168-71 (1982).

This article advocates the adoption of the five year limitations period found in the recently
enacted Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act ("ITSFEA"), Pub. L. No. 100704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988), which pertains to lOb-5 actions relating to insider trading. The
SEC also has recommended the use of ITSFEA's limitations period for 10b-5 actions and a
few courts have considered, but not adopted, that approach. See infra notes 231-241 and
accompanying text.

14. Not only has the Supreme Court in several instances refused to review divergent
circuit court decisions adopting various state rules, see, e.g., Nickels v. Koehler Management
Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977) (adopting state rule
for fraud claims); Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977) (adopting state rule for blue sky claims), it denied certiorari
of the Third Circuit's recent decision to abandon that traditional rule in favor of a uniform

federal limitations period. See Data Access, 843 F.2d 1537; Bloomenthal, supra note 12, at
235-37, nn.2, 4, 8, 10.
15. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 5, 102 Stat. 4681 (adding section 20A(a), to be codified at

15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a)).
16. Id.
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TIE TRADITIONAL METHOD' 7 : ADOPTION OF THE FoRuM STATE'S MOST
CLOSELY ANALOGOUS LIMITATIONS PERIOD AND THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN

THAT METHOD

The practice of adopting state statutes of limitation by federal courts
for federal causes of action can be traced to a line of old decisions construing
the Rules of Decisions Act.' 8 The first Supreme Court decision to discuss
the applicability of the Rules of Decisions Act to a limitations issue was
M'Cluny v. Silliman.1 9 In M'Cluny a purchaser of land sued the federal
land office registrar, alleging that the federal official wrongfully had refused
to enter a tendered land purchase application. The purchaser had waited
thirteen years, however, to bring his suit.20 The trial court dismissed the
case as being outside the forum state's limitations period, and the purchaser
appealed his way to the Supreme Court, arguing that "no statute of
limitations of the state ... is pleadable ... in the circuit court of the
United States ... where the plaintiff's rights accrued to him under a law

of congress." 2' The Court simply assumed without any analysis that the
Rules of Decisions Act required that a state limitations period apply,
probably because the plaintiff never suggested a viable alternative. The
plaintiff's argument that it would be repugnant for a state limitations period
to apply to a federal right overlooked the fact that once a state limitations
period is adopted by the federal court, it becomes federal law.22 Although
the plaintiff also argued that the lack of uniformity resulting from adopting
state limitations periods should preclude the adoption of state limitations
periods,2 the Court rejected that argument by never addressing it.
The Supreme Court in Campbell v. HaverhilP4 again assumed, without
question, that the Rules of Decisions Act mandated application of the state
statute of limitations when there was no express federal limitations period.
The Court in Campbell, however, tacked on an exception that would apply
whenever the state's limitation period would discriminate against a federal
right, stating:
In such case it might be plausibly argued that it could never have
been intended by Congress that [the Rules of Decisions Act] should
apply to statutes passed in manifest hostility to Federal rights or
jurisdiction, but only to such as were uniform in their operation

17. For ease of reference in this article, the method of adopting the forum state's most
closely analogous statute of limitations shall sometimes be referred to as the "traditional rule."
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
19. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
20. M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 275-76 (1830).
21. Id. at 270.
22. See Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: FederalRights
of Action and State Statutes of Limitation, 65 CoRNELL L. Rv. 1011, 1028-29 (1980)
[hereinafter Special Project].
23. M'Cluny, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 278.
24. 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
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upon state and Federal rights and upon state and Federal courts.2Y

Again, however, the Court never considered the primary issue of whether
the right of action was created by state or federal law, and it never sought

to determine Congfess' intent. Instead it only considered the nonissue of
whether the court's jurisdiction was exclusive or concurrent. 26 Although by

the time of these decisions the Court had established its ability to make
federal common law, 27 the Court doubted its ability to fashion its own
28
limitations period.
The Supreme Court's view of the applicability of the Rules of Decisions

Act to adoption of a limitations period for federal causes of action took a
turn in Holmberg v. Armbrecht.29 Holmberg involved an action brought
under the Federal Farm Loan Act.30 Because the action was in equity, the
defendants pleaded laches as a defense and argued that the forum's most
analogous statute of limitations should be the guidepost to determine

whether laches should be employed. En route to a rejection of that defense,
the Court paused to note in dictum that "[a]s to actions at law, the silence
of Congress has been interpreted to mean that it is federal policy to adopt
' 3
the local law of limitation. '
Holmberg is a confused opinion. As authority for its dictum that state
statutes of limitation apply to actions at law in the absence of an express
federal limitation period, the Court cited three cases interpreting the Rules
of Decisions Act to mandate the application of state statutes of limitation. 32
Holmberg, however, did not cite the Rules of Decisions Act. Ironically,
although Holmberg usually is cited as mandating adoption of state limitations periods, the Court in Holmberg declined to do so.13 Indeed, the

25. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 615 (1895).
26. See Special Project, supra note 22, at 1031-34.
27. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842); Schofield, Swift v.
Tyson, Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law in State and Federal Courts, 4 ILL. L. REv. 533,
536 (1910) ("No judge in England or in the United States ever did need to be told ...that
he has the power to make law.").
28. See generally Special Project, supra note 22, at 1034.
29. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
30. 39 Stat. 374 (1916) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-181, Title V, § 5.26(a), 85 Stat. 624
(1971), 12 U.S.C. § 812 (1988)).
31. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (citing Campbell v. Haverhill,
155 U.S. 610 (1895)); Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 (1941); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
32. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395 (citing Campbell, 155 U.S. 610; ChattanoogaFoundry,
203 U.S. 390; Rawlings, 312 U.S. 96).
The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988), states:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.
Id. The Special Project, supra note 22, contains a thorough history and criticism of the
Supreme Court's decisions preceding Holmberg.
33. See Bloomenthal, supra note 12, at 237-38.

PRIVATE lob-5 ACTIONS
Supreme Court recently cited Holmberg as support for the notion that it
"has not hesitated to turn away from state law."13 4 Although some courts
have continued to argue that the Rules of Decision Act mandates adoption
of state limitations periods to "fill in the gap" of a non-existent federal
limitations period,35 commentators have suggested that such a notion should
have been dispelled by Holmberg16 If congressional intent can be ascertained
through legislative history, presumptions, or otherwise, the Rules of Decisions Act is inapplicable because Congress is deemed to have spoken.
Ever since the issue of what limitations period, if any,3 7 applies to
private38 rule lOb-5 actions was first presented to a district court in Osborne
v. Mallory,3 9 and to a court of appeal in Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co.,40 federal courts uniformly have relied on Holmberg when adopt-

ing the forum state's most analogous limitations period. Until only recently,
all twelve circuit courts applied the forum state's limitations periods
in lOb-5 actions, 4' and the Supreme Court seems to have endorsed that

34. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 148 (1987) (quoting
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72 (1983)).
35. The majority opinion in Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 143, gave short shrift to this
argument. See also id. at 161 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
36. See Special Project, supra note 22, at 1041 (1980).
A careful reading of Holmberg reveals that the Court did not mandate adoption of local
law; instead, the Court allowed such adoption:
The implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of the
federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where Congress has not
spoken but left matters for judicial determination within the general framework of
familiar legal principles.
327 U.S. at 395 (citing Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-52 (1939)).
37. It might be argued that, because courts have presumed from congressional silence
an intent to permit a cause of action under rule lOb-5, we should also presume from the fact
that no limitations period was created that Congress did not want there to be a limitations
period. However, as would be expected, the prospect of an implied right of action unlimited
by any time constraints has not been gleefully accepted by the courts. See Moviecolor, Ltd.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.) ("Congress could not
have intended an unlimited period for enforcement" of federal tights with no express federal
limitations period). In Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805), Chief Justice
Marshall cautioned that having no statute of limitations would be "utterly repugnant to the
genius of our laws." Cf. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 166 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing in the
context of a RICO case that because Congress did not create a limitations period for the
RICO civil right of action, if no state analogy is apparent, there should be no limitations
period).
38. Apparently, there is no limitations period on actions brought by the SEC. See SEC
v. Continental Advisers, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,489, at 93,819 (D.D.C. 1978) (citing
United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940)).
39. 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
40. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
41. See, e.g., Corwin v. Marney, Orton Inv., 843 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 305; Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984); Vucinich v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 739 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Kennedy v. Tallant,
710 F.2d 711 (l1th Cir. 1983); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983); Herm v.
Stafford, 663 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1981); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l Student Mktg.
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approach. 42 Hence, regardless of whether Holmberg did, or did not, mandate

this traditional rule in lOb-5 cases, the rule exists.
Although courts in the past have agreed that the forum state's "most
closely analogous" limitations period should be applied in private lOb-5

actions, there has been no consensus on which state statute is "most closely
analogous."

For example, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits apply the

forum's limitations period for state blue sky 43 claims, noting that the purpose
of state securities statutes is identical to that of the 1934 Act. 44 Other
circuits, such as the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, 4 apply the forum
state's limitations period for fraud. The First Circuit, on the other hand,46
has adopted the forum state's limitation period for personal injury actions.

The Fifth and Sixth Circuits (and the Third Circuit prior to its recent
decision in In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation)47 have mixed
decisions, sometimes adopting the forum's blue sky limitations period and

Corp., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Sharp v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982) (recently overruled
by In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
131); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 644 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1981); O'Hara
v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); Cook v. Avien,
Inc., 573 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1978); de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th
Cir. 1971).
42. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384 n.18 (1983); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976).
43. State securities laws generally are referred to as "blue sky" laws. The term apparently
originated in a 1916 article:
A definition of "Blue Sky Law" is necessary. The State of Kansas, most wonderfully
prolific and rich in farming products, has a large proportion of agriculturists not
versed in ordinary business methods. The State was the hunting ground of promoters
of fraudulent enterprises; in fact their frauds became so barefaced that it was stated
that they would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple. Metonymically they
became known as blue sky merchants, and the legislation intended to prevent their
frauds was called Blue Sky Law.
Muluey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. Timms 37 (1916). See 12 J. LONG, BLUE SKY LAw 1-2 n.
5 (1989 rev. ed.); L. Loss & D. CowEr, BLUE SKY LAW 7 (1958). The Supreme Court, not
long after publication of the Muluey article, used the term in describing "speculative schemes
which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky." Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242
U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
44. Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500, 1509
(11th Cir. 1986); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 644 F.2d 690 (8th Cir.
1981); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852.
45. Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 739 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984);
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983); Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870
(10th Cir. 1982); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895; Briskin v. Ernst & Ernst, 589 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); de
Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
46. Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685 (Ist Cir. 1978); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781
(1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879.
47. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131.
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period, depending upon how the
sometimes adopting another limitations
48
particular claim is characterized.
Questions of application are found not only among the circuits but
within them as well. Although there are decisions on the books establishing
lOb-5 limitations periods for the great majority of the fifty states, many of
those cases were determined on an ad hoc basis, and subsequent modifications to the state limitations periods adopted in those cases and the state
statutes to which they apply may cast some doubt on their continued
49
applicability.
As long as limitations periods for rule 10b-5 claims are drawn from
analogous state periods, plaintiffs can never know with any degree of
certainty what deadlines they face in filing a claim, and potential defendants
will never be free from the fear of a lawsuit.5 0 Statutes of limitation are
designed to protect defendants from stale claims by terminating contingent
liabilities at specific points in time while at the same time providing a
potential plaintiff a reasonable time in which to bring suit. 51 To achieve
that purpose, limitation periods must be predictable. Neither plaintiffs nor
defendants are well served by a statute of limitations if it is difficult to
determine the length of the limitations period, the point at which the
limitations period should start to run, or when it is tolled, since litigation
will be necessary to determine whether the statute has run. To obtain a
clearly ascertainable cutoff in the securities fraud context, it is necessary to

48. Compare Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying blue sky law);
Carothers v. Rice, 633 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 988 (1981); O'Connell v.
Economic Research Analysts, 499 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975)
with Marx v. Centran Corp., 747 F.2d 1536 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying fraud limitations period);
Breen v. Centex Corp., 695 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1983); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d
5 (5th Cir. 1967); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967). See also Sharp v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Biggans v. Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611
F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979).
49. See, e.g., Hoff Research & Dev. Laboratories, Inc. v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 426
F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1970); see also Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 680-81 (6th Cir. 1981)
(quoting McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 598 F.2d 888, 893 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979))
(noting that "it is undeniably untidy to insist that the statute of limitations applicable to a
federal cause of action vary from time to time dependent upon changes in local law ...
[Tihat circumstance, however, is an unavoidable side effect of the basic rule of requiring
application of state statutes of limitation.").
50. See Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ("It is rudimentary
that the purpose of a Statute of Limitations is to ... give potential defendants a fixed point
in time when they will no longer have to fear a lawsuit.").
51. See Allen v. United States, 542 F.2d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1976) (statutes of limitation
"serve to strike a balance between the need for certainty and predictability in legal relationships
and the role of the courts in resolving private disputes."); Gates Rubber Co. v. U.S.M. Corp.,
508 F.2d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Mhe interest in certainty and finality in the administration
of our affairs, especially in commercial transactions, makes it desirable to terminate contingent
liabilities at specific points in time."); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, 63
HAgv. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950) ("There comes a time when [the defendant] ought to be
secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations").
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achieve uniformity among the districts because the interstate character of
securities transactions, coupled with the 1934 Act's nationwide jurisdiction

and venue provisions, exposes potential defendants to the possibility of
actions in any number of states. Potential defendants cannot rest assured
that they cannot be sued successfully merely because the limitations period
in their state has expired. Rather, they must look to the limitations period
of every state touched by their transactions.

As the law now stands, statutes of limitation in lob-5 actions do not,52
and cannot, provide the desired fairness, predictability, or uniformity.
Plaintiffs in some states are given inordinately long periods in which to
sue, while in other jurisdictions their claims are cut off quickly. Whereas a
Tennessee court would apply a ten year limitation period borrowed from

that state's laws,

53

a defrauded plaintiff suing in Maryland federal court

has but one year to seek redress. 54 Utilizing the state blue sky period, as is

done in the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, provides some predictability but
not uniformity, because blue sky statutes across the nation contain widely
5
varying limitations periods.
The practical problems associated with the application of state limitation

periods to lOb-5 claims are enormous. If a case is transferred from one
district to another, issues arise as to which state's statute to apply. 56 The

difficulties created by this lack of uniformity among states become particularly acute in multidistrict cases, which often arise as a natural result of
the national and international scope of the securities markets. Hence, an

even thornier problem is presented if two (or more) class actions are7

transferred to one court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

52. The Third Circuit's decision in Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3rd
Cir. 1979), exemplifies the anomalies of this claim-by-claim approach. The plaintiff in Roberts
was an allegedly defrauded seller who did not sell his stock in a tender offer because certain
facts were not disclosed to him. In prior cases the Third Circuit had adopted the forum's
statute of limitations for civil actions under the state securities act. Had that limitations period
been adopted in Roberts the plaintiff would have had two years to file suit. However, because
the forum's blue sky statute did not permit a cause of action by a defrauded seller, the court
instead adopted the forum's six-year limitations period for common law fraud, thus providing
defrauded sellers three times as long to file a lawsuit as defrauded buyers.
53. Denny v. Performance Sys., Inc., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,387, at 91,981 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
54. O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981).
55. See Task Force Report, supra note 12, at Appendix B.
56. It is generally held that if an action is transferred for the convenience of the parties,
the statute of limitations of the transferor jurisdiction governs. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
See Loughan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 624 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1980); Schreiber v. AllisChambers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979) (applying limitations period of transferor
court). If, however, the transfer results from a lack of venue or personal jurisdiction, the laws
of the transferee state govern (presumably including its choice of law principles which could
result in the application of still another state's statute). See Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d
750, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,015, at 91,567 (D. Kan. 1978); 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
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The transferee court presiding over a consolidated case first must figure out

how the circuit court in which each transferor district court sits would
approach the issue, and it then must use that approach to determine which
limitations period of the transferor state the transferor court would deem
to be most appropriate. 8 If the transferor state5 9 has a borrowing statute,
the complexity of the issue grows exponentially.

In addition to the lack of uniformity and predictability in applying
states' limitation periods, the rules governing when the chosen period begins
to run and when, if ever, it is tolled vary among the courts. Most courts
have ruled that federal law determines when the statute of limitations begins
to run in a lOb-5 case. 60 Those courts have applied the federal equitable
tolling doctrine 6' in holding that the limitations period begins to run when
the plaintiff knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should

62 Some courts, however, have not applied the
have known, of the fraud.
63
federal tolling doctrine.

58. See, e.g., Clinton Oil, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,015.
59. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Durham v. Business Management Assoc., 847 F.2d 1505, 1508 (l1th Cir.
1988) ("while state law governs the limitations period applicable to a section 10(b) action,
federal law governs when the limitations period begins to run."); Semegen v. Weidner, 780
F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir. 1985); Suslick v. Rothschild, 741 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1984);
Kennedy v. Tallant, 710 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1983); Summer v. Land & Leisure, Inc., 664
F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1981); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687,
691-92 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895; ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 929 (2d
Cir. 1980); Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 576 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1978); Cook v. Avien, Inc.,
573 F.2d 685, 694 (Ist Cir. 1978); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852.
61. The Supreme Court in Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1874), described this
doctrine as follows:
[When there has been no negligence or laches on the part of a plaintiff in coming
to the knowledge of the fraud which is the foundation of the suit, and when the
fraud has been concealed, or is of such character as to conceal itself, the statute
does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered by, or becomes known to, the
party suing ....
Id.
62. See, e.g., Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932; Kennedy v. Tallant, 710 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1983);
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 1983); Breen v. Centex Corp., 695 F.2d 907,
911 (5th Cir. 1983); Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 706 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); Herm v.
Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 682 (6th Cir. 1981); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross,
651 F.2d 687, 691-92 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895; Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., N.A. v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied
sub nom., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 452 U.S. 954
(1981); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir.
1981); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 694-95 (1st Cir. 1978); Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 917 (4th Cir. 1973) (actual discovery or should have discovered with
reasonable diligence), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784
(1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879.
63. See Logan v. Ledford, 699 F. Supp. 141, 144-45 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Zigel v. Garcia,
[1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,455-56 (D. Md. 1988); Shelter Mutual
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Anomalous results sometimes occur when federal tolling rules are applied. Most blue sky statutes have adopted a version of the limitations
period found in the Uniform Securities Act, which provides a limitations
period running from the date of the contract of sale. 64 Application of the
federal tolling period to these statutes of limitation results in longer limi-

tation periods than are available under the supposedly analogous state
statutes. For example, although the blue sky limitations period for Arkansas

is five years from the contract of sale, for a rule lOb-5 action borrowing
that limitations period the limitations period is five years from the time the
investor discovered the fraud, and the federal equitable tolling doctrine
places no absolute cap on the period. 65 If the Arkansas legislature had
intended its limitations period to be used in conjunction with a tolling rule,

it may well have chosen a shorter period.
Application of the federal tolling doctrine does reduce some of the
inconsistencies between various states' limitation periods by creating a
uniform starting point for the chosen limitation periods. However, uncertainty still is engendered because the federal tolling doctrine is not applied
uniformly by the various circuit courts. The Tenth Circuit, for example,
holds that the determination of when the plaintiff reasonably should have
been put on notice of the fraud is a subjective determination, affected by

each individual plaintiff's sophistication and knowledge 6 The Second, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, apply an objective standard that
requires the plaintiff only to exercise the degree of diligence that a reasonable
person would have used under the circumstances. 67 Some courts hold that
when a defendant actively conceals his fraud, the plaintiff is relieved of any
duty to discover it.68 Others require the plaintiff to exercise due diligence
to discover a fraud practiced upon him even if the defendant is actively

Ins. Co. v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 7, 569 F. Supp. 310, 321-22 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
These district court decisions rely generally upon two civil rights cases decided by the Supreme
Court, Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), and Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261 (1985). Those two cases, however, are not analogous to lOb-5 litigation in this context
because the express language of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (with which those cases dealt) seems
to require by its terms that state tolling rules be adopted in civil rights actions. See Ohio v.
Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 691 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 895.
64. Uniform Securities Act § 410(e) (1957).
65. Pinney v. Edward D. Jones & Co., Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1419, 1421-22 (W.D. Ark.

1989).
66. See Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 408 (D. Colo.
1979), aff'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895.
67. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1983); Campbell v.
Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1126-27 (6th Cir. 1982); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 997-98
(7th Cir. 1969).
68. See, e.g., Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780 (11th Cir. 1988); Suslick
v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1984); Robertson v. Seidman &
Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1979); Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 509-10 (7th Cir.
1975).
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concealing the fraud. 69 Nonetheless, although the federal tolling rule is not
treated uniformly by all circuits, it certainly promotes more uniformity than
adoption of fifty states' tolling rules.

Problems also arise when the forum state has a statute by which it
borrows the limitations period of another state. The anomalies produced
by such borrowing statutes are illustrated by the case of Berry Petroleum
Co. v. Adams and Peck.70 Although the Second Circuit uniformly adopts

the forum state's limitations period for fraud actions, the forum in Berry
Petroleum had a statute directing that the limitations period of the state in
which the action accrued be applied. Because the action accrued in Texas,
the Second Circuit was forced to determine what approach the Fifth Circuit
would use in adopting a limitations period. The Second Circuit then chose
Texas' blue sky limitations period because it thought the Fifth Circuit would
do so. However, subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions have adopted the fraud
7
limitations period for rule lOb-5 actions in Texas. '

Similarly, in Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman,72 the forum state had

a borrowing statute that directed the Second Circuit to apply Alaska's
limitations period. Again, the Second Circuit faced the difficult question of

which limitations period would be applied in a state outside of its jurisdiction, and the Second Circuit chose Alaska's blue sky period. If the law of

a state in the Second Circuit had applied, the court would have applied a
fraud limitations period.
Although the unfairness to litigants inherent in the inconsistencies created
by some states having longer or shorter limitations periods than others for

73
the same federal claim may not rise to the level of a denial of due process,

such wide discrepancies in state limitation periods, coupled with the nationwide service of process and venue provisions of the 1934 Act, 74 create a
69. See, e.g., Campbell, 676 F.2d at 1128; Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber &
Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 694-95 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895.
70. 518 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1975).
71. See, e.g., Breen v. Centex Corp., 695 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1983).
72. 609 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1979).
73. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-05, 703 n.4 (1966) ("[T]he
lack of uniformity in limitations provisions [under §301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947] is unlikely to have a substantial effect upon the private definition or effectuation
of 'substantive' or 'primary' rights."); cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,
729 (1979) (value of uniformity with respect to priority of liens rules is insufficient to "override
intricate state laws of general applicability on which private creditors base their daily commercial
transactions.").
74. Section 27 of the 1934 Act states that a civil cause of action may be brought
in any [district in which any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred],
or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the
defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
Section 27 of the 1934 Act is "intended to grant a potential plaintiff a liberal choice in
selecting his forum, and gives teeth to the enforcement of the law." 5C A. JAcoBs, supra
note 13, § 287; see also Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 188 (1979) (White,
J., dissenting); SEC v. Elec. Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1988); Ritter v.
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substantial incentive for forum shopping. 7 Such forum shopping "virtually
guarante[es] ... complex and expensive litigation over what should be a
straightforward matter," 76 unfairly burdens the courts of states with more
liberalized limitations periods, and adds undue expense to both plaintiffs and
defendants who may be dragged to far away states to litigate their disputes.
Fortunately, recent Supreme Court decisions in nonsecurities cases suggest that it is appropriate to revisit the question of the applicability of the
"traditional" Holmberg rule to rule 10b-5 actions.

THE SuPm Ma CouRT's CHANGING ViEw: DEVOLUTION OF THE TRADITONA
RULE
A.

Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the Appropriate Limitations
Periodfor Rule 10b-5 Claims

Although the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue of
what, if any, statute of limitations should be applied to rule 10b-5 actions,
two of its seminal 10b-5 decisions, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder77 and
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,7 8 are premised on the applicability of
Holmberg. In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court stated in a footnote:
Since no statute of limitations is provided for civil actions under §
10(b), the law of limitations of the forum state is followed as in
other cases of judicially implied remedies. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). Although it is not always certain
which state statute of limitations should be followed, such statutes
of limitations usually are longer than the period provided under §
79
13 [of the Securities Act of 1933].
Not only did the Court in Hochfelder recognize the applicability of the
traditional Holmberg rule to 10b-5 actions, but that conclusion formed a
part of the basis for its ultimate ruling that scienter is an element of the
cause of action. The Supreme Court reasoned that Congress enacted particularly short statutes of limitation for the express civil liability provisions

Zuspan, 451 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Carpenter v. Hall, 352 F. Supp. 806, 809-10
(S.D. Tex. 1972) (stating that § 27 provides "teeth for enforcement" of federal securities

laws.). The policy further is to provide a forum for suits involving multistate frauds no matter
how many states defendants are citizens of or may do business in. Carpenter, 352 F. Supp.
at 809.
75. See Schulman, supra note 12, at 648.
76. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987) (quoting

Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law 391 [hereinafter ABA Report] (1985)).
77. 425 U.S. 151 (1976).
78. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
79. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 151, 210 n.10 (1976).
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of the 193380 and 193481 securities acts because those causes of action
generally do not require proof of scienter; most are either strict liability or
negligence-based statutes rather than fraud causes of action. The Court held
that it would be appropriate to impose a scienter requirement in rule lOb5 actions81 because the state statutes of limitation applied to lOb-5 actions
generally are longer than the rules applicable to the express causes of action
in the federal securities acts.83 Hence, not only has the Supreme Court
stated (albeit in a footnote) that the forum state's most analogous limitations
period applies in a rule lOb-5 case, the Court's decision in the case rested
in part on that assumption.
In Huddleston the Supreme Court similarly stated,
[C]ourts [in rule 10b-5 actions] look to the most analogous statute
of limitations of the forum state, which is usually longer than the
period provided for Section 11 actions."
The Court again relied on the fact that rule lOb-5 limitations periods
adopted from the forum states generally are longer than the periods for
express civil liabilities under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) in
concluding that rule lOb-5 actions and the express civil liability sections of
the 1933 Act are not mutually exclusive. The Court reasoned that because
the elements of a rule lOb-5 claim impose a significantly greater burden on
the plaintiff than the express civil liability sections, and because the limitations period for rule lOb-5 actions accordingly is longer than for such
express provisions, plaintiffs should be permitted to join claims for violation
of rule lOb-5 with claims for violations of the 1933 Act.
Thus, twice the Supreme Court has stated that courts should look to
the most analogous state limitations period in rule lob-5 cases. Although
neither case turned on the question of the applicability of Holmberg, both
cases shaped the law of federal securities actions based on the assumption
that the limitation period for lob-5 claims is longer than the one year period
contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.

80. See section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
81. See section 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988); section 16(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1988); section 18(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1988); section 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b)

(1988).
82. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 209-11.
83. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210 n.10; Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 384 n.18 (1983). As discussed infra at notes 138-51 and accompanying text, there are
important distinctions in the language used in the various limitations periods applicable to the
express civil liability sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Although most of those limitations
periods use a one year from discovery rule with some form of three year cap, there are
variations in the language used to define "discovery," and in the starting point for the
maximum three year period. For ease of reference, all of these express limitations are sometimes
referred to in this article as being the one year/three year rule.
84. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 384 n.18.
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B. The Supreme Court's Recent Departurefrom the TraditionalRule
Prior to Holmberg, courts construed the Rules of Decisions Act as
mandating the application of state limitations periods. Subsequent to Holmberg, courts generally applied state statutes of limitation, although the
rationale supporting the application of state law has been less clear. In a
series of cases since the Hochfelder and Huddleston decisions, the Court
further has modified its views regarding the methodology of supplying a
limitations period to implied causes of action, but the Court has not yet
applied its new method to a rule 10b-5 cause of action.
The Court began its departure from the traditional rule in DelCostello
v. InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters.8 DelCostello involved an action
on a collective bargaining agreement and allegations that a union breached
its duty of fair representation in grievance procedures. In determining what
statute of limitations to apply, the Court considered state statutes of
limitation for actions to set aside arbitration decisions, state legal malpractice
statutes of limitation and the federal statutory
limitations period for viol86
ations of the National Labor Relations Act.
The Court first stated the general rule of Holmberg that where Congress
has not provided a statute of limitations, the court should look to state
law. After noting that it had always permitted an exception to the traditional
rule, 7 the Court in DelCostello subtly expanded its view of the circumstances
that would justify that exception. Prior to DelCostello, the Court rejected
state limitations periods in favor of an analogous federal limitations period
only if the state statute of limitations was "inconsistent" with the federal
policies involved.8 8 For example, in OccidentalLife Insurance Co. v. EEOC 9
the EEOC brought a civil action against Occidental Life Insurance alleging
violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 90 The EEOC's preliminary
investigation of the case, however, had taken three years, and the district
court dismissed the case on the basis of the most closely analogous state
limitations period, which was one year. The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
[The one-year statute of limitations applied by the District Court
in this case could under some circumstances directly conflict with
the timetable for administrative action expressly established in the
1972 Act.
But even in cases involving no inevitable and direct conflict with

85. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
86. Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
87. Delrtostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161-62 (citing Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977)) (reasoning that adoption of state limitations
periods for EEOC enforcement actions under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 would
undermine effective enforcement of Act by placing too onerous burden on agency).
88. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 162 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
89. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 to 2000e-17 (1976).
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the express time periods provided in the Act, absorption of state
limitations periods would be inconsistent with the congressional
intent underlying the enactment of the 1972 amendments. 9'
The Court in Occidental further observed that because "[s]tate legislatures
do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind,"
federal courts should refuse to adopt state limitations rules that would
"frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies." 92 Due
to the EEOC's heavy case load and duty to investigate allegations prior to
instituting suit, the "vagaries of diverse state limitations statutes" 93 would
create an inestimable burden on the EEOC's efforts to penalize civil rights
violations.
The Court's long-held view that state limitations periods should not be
adopted for federal claims if they are inconsistent with, or discriminate
against, federal policies would seem to be mandated by the supremacy
clause. 94 In Delcostello, however, the Court went beyond the requirements
of the supremacy clause and allowed an exception to the traditional rule if
a federal limitations statute was "more closely analogous" and "more
appropriate" 95 than state law alternatives; the Court no longer insisted that
the state limitations period be "inconsistent" with the federal policies at
stake. 96

91. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1977) (emphasis added);
see also Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 615 (1895) (allowing exception to adoption of
state rules for "statutes ... discriminating against causes of action enforceable only in the
federal courts.") (emphasis added). See generally Special Project, supra note 22, at 1045-55.
92. Occidental, 432 U.S. at 367.
93. Id. at 371.
94. U.S. CONST., art. VI, c. 2. For example, at the time of passage of § 16(b) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the applicable limitations period borrowed from Alabama state law
was either three or six years, depending upon the nature of the employment agreement. But
after passage of the Act, Alabama carved out an exception for federal FLSA claims and
created for such federal claims a one year limitations period. The Fifth Circuit in Caldwell v.
Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 161 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1947), held that the new one
year limitations period was too short and discriminated against federal claims, thereby violating
the supremacy clause. Id. at 85-86; see also, e.g., Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151
F.2d 543, 546-47 (8th Cir. 1945), aff'd per curiam, 327 U.S. 757 (1946).
95. Although these two phrases seem redundant, the Court treats them as separate
requirements. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. at 171-72.
96. The Court in DelCostello concluded that neither the malpractice statute nor the
statute of limitations for actions to vacate arbitration awards was analogous to the actions
before it alleging violations of a collective bargaining agreement and breaches of a union's
duty of fair dealing. The Court was concerned that the extremely short time allowed to
challenge an arbitration award (30 days in one statute and 90 days in another) could not fairly
be applied to a union member challenging the representation given him by his representatives.
462 U.S. at 166. On the other hand, with respect to claims against the union, the three year
bar for legal malpractice actions also is not appropriate because of the lack of an analogy.
Federal law favors a "relatively rapid final resolution of labor disputes," a problem not
necessarily present when a party to a commercial arbitration sues his lawyer. Id. at 168.
Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, which establishes a six month limitations
period, was analogous to the case before the Court, because the NLRA had been designed by
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DelCostello thus contrasts sharply with the Court's prior decisions
permitting courts to abandon state limitation periods only when all the
state's statutes conflict or are inconsistent with the federal cause of action.
Moreover, although paying heed to the Rules of Decisions Act, the Court
in fact implicitly rejected its prior decisions relying upon the Rules of
Decision Act, referring to the traditional rule as just "a sort of fallback
rule of thumb ...that, absent some sound reason to do otherwise, Congress
would likely intend that the courts follow their previous practice of borrowing state provisions." 97
The Court continued its devolution of the traditional rule in Wilson v.
Garcia.9" In Wilson the Court faced the issue of what limitations period
applies to implied causes of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which
like rule lOb-5, provides an implied remedy for a broad variety of wrongs.
As in rule lOb-5 cases, courts in section 1983 cases traditionally have adopted
the state's most closely analogous limitation period. 99 The determination of
which of the state's limitations periods should apply generally had been
made on a claim-by-claim basis, which would entail a fact-intensive procedure of comparing and analogizing the civil rights claims made to similar
violations of state law.'0
The Court was concerned, however, with the uncertainty and inefficiency
of this procedure, which often resulted in application of a different statute
of limitations depending upon how the claim was pleaded.' 0 ' Accordingly,
the Court held that the determination of which state limitations period to
apply should be made on a statute-by-statute basis rather than on a claimby-claim basis.'02 In other words, in determining which state limitations
period to apply, the court should find one limitations period that served
the purposes of section 1983, and that limitations period would be applied
to all causes of action brought pursuant to section 1983, regardless of how
each claim might be characterized.
Although the Supreme Court recognized that efforts to choose the most
analogous state limitations period "inevitably breednl uncertainty and timeconsuming litigation,"'0 3 and that "Congress intended the identification of
the appropriate statute of limitations to be an uncomplicated task for

Congress to accommodate a similar balance of interests between employers, employees, and
employee representatives. In fact, "[t]he NLRB has consistently held that all breaches of a
union's duty of fair representation are in fact unfair labor practices" under its statutory
authority. Id. at 170. DelCostello, by itself, arguably is a case involving a direct conflict
between the available state limitations periods and the federal interests at stake, regardless of
what the Court said. The Court, however, has not given such a restrictive view to the decision.
See Agency Holding Corp. v. Maiey-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1987).
97. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 160 n.12 (emphasis added).
98. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
99. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985).
100. Id.at 272.
101. Id.at 272-75.
102. Id.at 275.
103. Id.at 272.
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judges, lawyers and litigants,"' 4 it might be argued that Garcia lends further
support to the traditional rule. The Court in Garcia did not look to federal

law to achieve uniformity, but instead was satisfied to avoid much of the
collateral litigation connected with choosing a state limitations period by
choosing one period on a statute-by-statute basis at the expense of uniformity
among states. But because of the the special circumstances of the civil rights
acts at issue in that case, the Court may have been required to adopt a

state limitations period. 05
Not long after the Wilson decision, the Court in Agency Holding Corp.
v. Malley-Duff & Associates'06 addressed concerns similar to those involved
in the context of rule lOb-5 actions, and moved toward a complete rejection
of prior standards. Although the Court in Malley-Duff recognized that it
had "generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the
most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law,"' 0 7 it considerably broadened the scope of available alternatives to include "a timeliness

rule drawn from elsewhere in federal law, ' 108and held that the goal of
uniformity could, by itself, be a sufficient reason to justify a departure
from the traditional rule in some circumstances so as to allow adoption of
an analogous federal limitations period.
Malley-Duff involved the question of what limitations period should
apply to civil actions brought pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),109 which includes an express provision
for civil liability, but does not contain a limitations period. The Court in
Malley-Duff again subtly modified its approach to the issue and stated a

new formula to follow in approaching the problem. The Court in'MalleyDuff explained that

[a]lthough it has been suggested that federal courts always should
apply the state statute of limitations most analogous to each indi-

104. Id. at 275.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982 & Supp. 1987) states:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the
provisions of this Title . . . for the protection of all persons in the United States in
their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in
conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to
carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object,
or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish
offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in
the trial and disposition of the cause....
Id. (emphasis added).
106. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
107. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, 483 U.S. 143, 146 (1987) (quoting
DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-59).
108. Id. at 147 (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 159 n.13) (emphasis added).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
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vidual case whenever a federal statute is silent on the proper
limitations period, a clear majority of the Court [in DelCostello]
rejected such a single path. 10
The Court then described its two-step approach in terms again only subtly
different from those employed in DelCostello, but with very different
implications.
The initial inquiry was "whether all claims arising out of the federal
statute 'should be characterized in the same way, or whether they should
be evaluated differently depending upon the varying factual circumstances
and legal theories presented in each individual case."" ' , That is, should the
determination of what limitations period is to be used be made on a claimby-claim basis, or on a statute-by-statute basis? As did the Supreme Court
in Wilson with respect to civil rights claims, and the Eleventh Circuit in
Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore 2 with respect
to rule lob-5 actions, the Court in Malley-Duff ruled that a statute-bystatute determination was appropriate for RICO claims. It is in the next
step of the inquiry that the Malley-Duff decision departs from prior practice.
The second step of the Court's approach required a court to determine
whether to use a federal or a state limitations period." 3 The Court in MalleyDuff mentioned the "longstanding practice of borrowing state law and the
congressional awareness of this practice,1" 4 but asserted that "in some
circumstances the Court has found it more appropriate to borrow limitation
periods found in other federal, rather than state, statutes.""' 5
After noting that federal courts have been inconsistent in their approaches to selecting a limitations period for RICO actions, which caused
the current state of the law to be "confused, inconsistent, and unpredictable,"" 6 the Court determined that uniformity was such an overwhelming
necessity in RICO actions that the Court would look to federal law for a
limitations period." 7 The Court then began its quest for a federal limitations
period and seized upon the four year statute of the Clayton Act." 8 In a
departure from prior cases, the Court did not adopt a uniform state law
analogy, as in Wilson," 9 nor did it find a federal limitations period that

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 146 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
Id. at 147 (quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268).
788 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1986).
Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 147.
Id.

115. Id. at 147-48.

116. Id. at 148 (quoting ABA Report, supra note 76, at 391).
117. Id. at 148-50.
118. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15

U.S.C. § 15 (1988)).
119. The Court also took note of the fact that an action under § 1983, unlike RICO or
10b-5, "most commonly involves a dispute wholly within one State," Malley-Duff, 483 U.S.
at 154, and it recognized that the "atrocities" that led Congress to enact 42 U.S.C. § 1983
"plainly sounded in tort." Id. at 152 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277).
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arguably was directly applicable to the cause of action being asserted, as in
DelCostello, 20 nor did it find that all potential state limitations periods
were inimical to the policies of RICO. Instead, the Court found it sufficient
that "a uniform statute of limitations is necessary to avoid intolerable
'uncertainty and time-consuming litigation." ' 21 Further, the Court chose a
uniform federal, rather than state, statute, not because the available state
alternatives were inconsistent with federal policies, but only because the
federal limitations period in the Clayton Act "offers a far closer analogy
to RICO."'' 2 According to the Court, the practical problems involved made
the Clayton Act limitation period "significantly more appropriate" than
any state law alternative.'2
C. Application of the Recent Supreme Court Decisions to Implied
Actions Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Courts have been slow in lOb-5 cases to accept the Supreme Court's
invitation to revisit the propriety of their use of the traditional rule. In
Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman, 124 the Eleventh Circuit attempted to add some level of certainty to the process without departing
from the precedent of the Hochfelder and Huddleston footnotes. 25 The
court adopted the analysis of the Wilson decision and abandoned its prior
ad hoc approach in favor of a strict rule favoring adoption of the forum
state's blue sky limitations period regardless of the precise nature of the
claim asserted. Although the Eleventh Circuit's approach, modeled on
Wilson, lends some certainty to the issue in that circuit by removing the
initial inquiry of which state limitations period is most analogous, it does
not add uniformity because state blue sky limitation periods across the
nation are not uniform. Friedlanderwas decided prior to the Court's decision
in Malley-Duff, but the Eleventh Circuit has since reaffirmed its Friedlander
26
decision in a panel decision and refused to reconsider its holdings en banc.
The Third Circuit in In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation'27
had the benefit of the Malley-Duff decision, but in its haste 28 to adopt a

120. See Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 167-68 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 150 (quoting Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272).
122. Id. at 150.
123. Id.at 153.
124. 788 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1986).
125. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
126. Smith v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied,
904 F.2d 712.
127. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131.
128. The Third Circuit was so anxious to abandon Holmberg that it used the recent
Supreme Court decisions more as a pretext than as a rationale. The district court certified to
the Third Circuit the following question:
For the statute of limitations found in the New Jersey law to apply to plaintiffs'
security claims herein, need plaintiffs' claims state a viable cause of action under
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uniform limitations period, it ignored the Supreme Court's holdings and
analysis in Hochfelder and Huddleston. Prior to Data Access, the Third
Circuit had criticized the lack of uniformity inherent in the traditional rule
in light of the fact that the securities laws were enacted "to fill a void in
the common law and to create remedies that would be uniform throughout
our nation's commercial universe.' ' '29 The Third Circuit properly recognized
that the national scope of securities markets made a uniform statute of
limitations not just a tool for judicial efficiency, but a virtual necessity.3 0
As was the case in the RICO statute that was the subject of Mally-Duff,
given the interstate nexus requirement of the 1934 Act which is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a lob-5 action, the multistate nature of claims under
section 10(b) virtually guarantees that "the statute of limitations of several
States could govern any given ... claim' ' 13' and that the borrowing of state
law will result in 'complex and expensive litigation over what should be a
straightforward matter."' 132 The Third Circuit, in Data Access therefore
concluded:
The necessity for uniform federal remedies ... would seem to
demand recourse to a uniform federal statute of limitations. A
broker in New York, an issuer in Delaware, a purchaser in San
Francisco, an accountant in New Jersey, and a lawyer in Pennsyl-

said blue sky law?
Id. at 1539.
The Third Circuit apparently had wanted to make such a change for some time, and did
so in the Data Access case even though neither party to the appeal suggested it. In Roberts
v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 1979), for example, the court lamented
the fact that it was required to look for an analogous state, rather than federal, limitations
period, stating:
Much can be said, perhaps, for a different rule in a different context directing a
federal court to statutes of limitations governing analogous federal causes of action.
But the rule has been otherwise for many years, and an inferior federal court is not
free to change it.
Id. Chief Judge Seitz in dissent in Roberts further stated,
Thus the policy question is how long a plaintiff should have to file suit once he
knows or should know of the wrongful conduct. After the plaintiff has notice, there
is a strong federal interest in requiring him to file suit quickly .... Were I writing
on a clean slate, I would be inclined to adopt that approach [of adopting an
analogous federal provision]. The Supreme Court, however, has rarely deviated from
the normal rule of looking to state statutes.
Id. at 462-63 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
129. DataAccess, 843 F.2d at 1548-49.
130. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-46 (1988); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975). In a typical tender offer involving a public company,
for example, virtually all of the transactions in securities will occur in interstate commerce
and will involve persons residing all across the country. The same is true of many new issues
of securities, whether they involve stocks, bonds, notes, or investment contracts in earthworm
farms. See Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979) (investments in earthworm farms
solicited by newsletter).
131. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 153.
132. Id. at 154 (quoting ABA Report, supra note 76, at 392).
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vania should be subject to the same statute of limitations for actions
based on section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5 .... [Ulniformity is not to be
found in the diverse body of state tort limitations ... [or in] the

plethora of state blue sky laws.'
The Third Circuit then did what it apparently had wanted to do for so
long: it legislated by judicial fiat a new federal statute of limitations for

lOb-5 actions modeled on assorted express civil liability provisions of both
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, all of which vary from rule 10b-5 in significant
respects. The Third Circuit's limitations period runs one year from constructive discovery of the violation, but no more than three years from the
violation, a limitations period with no counterpart in either the 1933 or
1934 Acts. The Third Circuit's self-made limitations period is neither more
closely analogous to the policies of rule 10b-5 nor more appropriate than
state rules for use in 10b-5 actions. The Third Circuit's attempt to overcome
the uniformity hurdle was only partially successful. In this case, partial
success was tantamount to complete failure, for the decision resulted in less
uniformity and less certainty.
1. The Lack of An Analogy Between the Third Circuit's Rule and lOb-5
The Third Circuit's decision to adopt a version of the various one year/
three year limitations periods of the 1933 and 1934 Acts is at odds with the
Supreme Court's opinion that lob-5 limitation periods should be longer
than those found in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In its head-long rush to
abandon Holmberg, the Third Circuit completely ignored the Supreme
Court's language in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder3 4 and Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston35 when it stated that the Supreme Court "has yet to rule
on" the question of what statute of limitation applies to rule lOb-5 actions.'36
More importantly, the court in Data Access also disregarded the fact that
the Supreme Court's decisions in both Hochfelder and Huddleston were
premised, in part, on the assumption that the limitations period in lob-5
actions is distinct from the express limitations periods of the 1933 and 1934
Acts, and in particular, that it is longer than the period prescribed in Data
Access. That assumption was integral to the Court's decision in Hochfelder
to impose a scienter requirement on rule lOb-5 actions and to its decision
in Huddleston that such express civil liability sections and rule lOb-5 claims
were not mutually exclusive. Clearly, it is inappropriate to divorce the
Supreme Court's holdings from their supporting rationales in this manner.
The Third Circuit's new rule also fails to supply a "closer analogy"
than state law because it is not an "analogy" at all-it is a new rule created
by the court. The Third Circuit purported to adopt the "general one-year-

133. 843 F.2d at 1549.
134. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).

135. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
136. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1539.
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after-discovery and three-years-after-violation schema"' 31 7 of the 1933 and

1934 Acts; however, close examination of the various express limitations
periods in those Acts reveals that no two are identical.
Section 13 of the 1933 Act 138 provides the limitation periods for actions

brought under Securities Act sections 11139 and 12.140 For actions under
section 11, the limitations period is one year from discovery of the true
facts, or after discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, but no more than three years after the security was bona fide

offered to the public.' 41 The limitations period for section 12(1) actions is
one year after the "violation," but no more than three years after the
security was bona fide offered to the public. The limitations period for
section 12(2) actions is one year from discovery of the true facts, or after
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
but no more than three years after the "sale."
The 1934 Act contains statutes of limitation for the express civil causes
of action under sections 9,142 16,143 18,1' and 29.145 The limitations period

for actions brought under section 9(e) is one year from discovery of the
facts constituting the cause of action, but no more than three years after
"violation" of the section. A claim under section 16(b) is in the nature of
a derivative action on behalf of the issuer, and the outside limit on
commencing an action is two years after the insider realized a "shortswing" profit. The limitations period for violations of section 18(c) is one
year from discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action, but no
more than three years after the "cause of action accrued."' 146 The limitation
period for a right of rescission under section 29 is one year after discovery

137. Id. at 1546.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988). Section 11 governs civil liabilities for false registration
statements.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988). Section 12(1) creates a right of action for violations of the
registration and prospectus delivery requirements of the 1933 Act, and section 12(2) prohibits
the making of misstatements or omissions in a prospectus or oral presentation regarding the
sale of securities.
141. There is some difference of opinion of whether the three year period runs from the
date the securities were first offered to the public, or last offered to the public. Compare Zola
v. Gordon, 685 F. Supp. 354, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) with In re Bestline Prod. Sec. and Antitrust
Litig., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,070, at 97,751 (S.D. Fla.
1975).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988). Section 9(e) prohibits manipulation of securities prices. It
is a limited right of action generally available only against brokers or dealers who deal directly
with investors.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). Section 16 requires certain listed insiders to report their
securities transactions to the SEC and prohibits short swing profits by such insiders.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988). Section 18(a) imposes liability for misleading statements
in any application, report, or document filed with the SEC.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1988). Section 29 deems void any contract made in violation
of the 1934 Act and provides a right of rescission of such contracts in certain circumstances.
146. Section 18(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1988).
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that the purchase or sale of the security involved a violation of the Act,
but no more than three years after the "violation."
The Third Circuit was deceived by the similarities among all these
limitation periods and overlooked their significant differences. Only the
limitation periods in the 1933 Act begin running from the time "discovery
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence...., 47
Presumably, the one year from discovery rules in the 1934 Act start to run
not when the plaintiff should reasonably have been placed on inquiry, but
only after the plaintiff has actual notice of facts that make up the violation.
Because the Third Circuit never recognized this distinction, it purported to
adopt both types of rules and never clarified whether it would impose a
reasonable diligence standard on plaintiffs.
In addition, the three year outside limits of some of the express periods
begin to run from the date of "sale,' '1 48 whereas others run from the date
of the "violation' '1 49 or from the "accrual of the claim."'' 0 The Third
Circuit undertook no analysis of these distinctions and simply adopted the
rules using the "violation" as the starting point. In lOb-5 litigation, however,
the time of the "violation" need not equate with the time of the "sale."
For example, in actively traded securities, a corporation may issue a press
release containing materially false and misleading representations as to its
financial condition. A month or more later, an investor may buy shares of
that corporation's stock in reliance on the previously issued press release.
Arguably, the "violation" occurred at the time the press release was issued,
but the "sale" did not occur for another month, and the investor's cause
of action could not have "accrued" until he purchased the stock.,-" The
Third Circuit made no effort to clarify which of these various periods it
was adopting, nor did it state why it chose a three year period running
from the violation rather than the sale.
The differing limitations periods of the 1933 and 1934 Acts also do not
furnish a "closer analogy ' 1S2 than blue sky laws to implied causes of action
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 because the blue sky civil liability
provisions are modeled on and are practically identical to section 12 of the
1933 Act, but materially different from lOb-5. The federal limitations periods
cannot constitute a closer analogy than the identical state periods because
the underlying causes of action are basically the same.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
148. See, e.g., § 13 of the 1933 Act, establishing a limitations period for violations of §
12(2).
149. See, e.g., § 29(b) of the 1934 Act, U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1988).
150. See § 18(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1988). No guidance is given on
whether a cause of action under § 18(c) accrues at the time of the misleading report, or upon
actual discovery, or constructive discovery. But see Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 445 F. Supp. 518, 526-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that cause of action under § 18(c)
"accrues" at time of sale).
151. See Jacobson, 445 F. Supp. at 526-27 (holding language in § 18(c) mandates that
three year limitations period runs from time of sale).
152. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 150.
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The Third Circuit's New Rule is Not "More Appropriate" for lob-5

Actions
Real world practicalities do not make the Third Circuit's limitations
rule "more appropriate" for use in lob-5 actions than state rules. The
usual reason that the Supreme Court has given for rejecting a state limitation
period in favor of an analogous federal period is that the state limitation
period is too short to achieve the federal policies at stake. For example, in

choosing a uniform federal limitations period for civil RICO claims, the
Court in Malley-Duff stated:
[A]pplication of a uniform federal limitations period avoids the
possibility of the. application of unduly short state statutes of
limitations that would thwart the legislative purpose of creating an

effective remedy." 3

The Third Circuit did the reverse of what the Supreme Court did in MalleyDuff and DelCostello; it rejected longer state limitations periods in favor
of a short federal statute. The one year/three year limitation period created

in Data Access is too short to effectuate the goals and policies of rule lOb5.114 As has been recognized by at least two circuit courts of appeals, the
"policies of the federal securities laws are best served by a longer, not a

shorter, statute of limitations.""' 5 The Supreme Court has recognized a
"congressional policy embodied in the 1934 Act" of "facilitating rule lOb5 litigation.' ' 5 6 Because regulatory agencies are overwhelmed by the amount
of corruption in the nation's financial markets, private actions under rule
lOb-5 are necessary to aid the SEC's enforcement of the law,17 and such

153. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 154; see also, e.g., DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166 ("We
conclude that state limitations periods for vacating arbitration awards fail to provide an
aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity to vindicate his rights under § 301 and the
fair representation doctrine."). See generally Special Project, supra note 22, at 1045-46.
154. See generally Legislation Comment, supra note 12 (criticizing adoption of one year/
three year limitations period for express civil liability provisions as too short to effectuate
policies of rule lOb-5).
155. Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1975); United
California Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004.
156. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988); see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S.
622, 633 (1988) (recognizing "the congressional policy favoring private suits as an important
mode of enforcing federal securities statutes").
157. See Inundated Agency, Busy SEC Must Let Many Cases, Filings Go Uninvestigated,
Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1985, at 1:
'The SEC is horribly overmatched by the bad guys in the marketplace,' declares
Royce Griffin, the president of the North American Securities Administrators Association, a group of state regulators ....
But concerns about the SEC's workload are growing. A recent report by an
American Bar Association task force says the enforcement staff may be too small
'for the commission to effectively discharge its statutory responsibilities.'...
Chairman Shad points out that the SEC isn't the sole defense against false or
misleading financial statements. If anything is seriously amiss, he contends, 'you
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private enforcement is facilitated by longer statutes of limitation.
The short limitations periods in the 1933 and 1934 Acts should be
viewed in the context of the lessened burden on the plaintiff in those statutes
to establish a cause of action. Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act and
section 18 of the 1934 Act are in the nature of strict liability claims. Unlike
lOb-5 actions, none of those express remedies requires proof of scienter,
reliance, or causation.'58 Those express causes of action place the burden
on the defendant to establish a "good faith" defense 5 9 and the class of
potential defendants is more narrowly defined than in lOb-5 actions.' 60 Similarly, a violation of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act requires no intent, causation,
or reliance, and because potential defendants must report their securities
trades to the SEC,' 61 discovery of violations usually is a straightforward
62
matter. In contrast, section 10(b) requires proof of some form of scienter,'

can be sure the private bar will be in there with class-action suits.'
Id. In testimony before the House Energy and Commerce Committee on July 11, 1988, SEC
Chairman Ruder stated the "private rights of action have traditionally served as an important
supplement to the Commission's enforcement of the federal securities laws." H. R. RP. No.
910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6063
[hereinafter HousE REPORT].
Even if the budgetary and political restraints on the SEC's active enforcement were lifted,
it has no statutory authority to recover complete damages for defrauded investors. See Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.RD. 472, 483-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
158. See, e.g., Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 1988);
Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 695-97 (5th Cir. 1971); L.
Loss, FUNDAMENTALs OF SECURTIES LITIGATION 889-90 (2d ed. 1988). One express cause of
action in the 1934 Act, § 9, does appear on its face to require a showing of scienter and
causation. Section 9 applies to persons who effect securities transactions, brokers and salesmen.
However, the section applies only to a limited class of claims and defendants. See generally 5
A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5, § 3.02[c] (rev. ed. 1990).
159. See, e.g., §§ 11(b), 12(2) of the 1933 Act and § 18 of the 1934 Act.
160. The universe of potential § 11 defendants is statutorily limited to persons who sign
the registration statement, directors of the issuer at the time the registration statement was
filed, underwriters, and "experts," who prepared or certified any part of the registration
statement or any report used in connection with the registration. Liability for violations of §
12 of the 1933 Act is limited to "sellers" of the security at issue. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486
U.S. 622, 641-47 (1988). Section 18 of the 1934 Act applies only to persons who make (or
cause to be made) false filings with the SEC, and § 9(e) concerns only brokers or dealers
dealing directly with investors. Rule lOb-5, however, is read expansively, and in addition to
covering a much broader range of activities (such as churning and insider trading), it applies
to a wider range of potential defendants. Unlike the express civil liability sections, liability
under rule lOb-5 can be predicated upon "aiding and abetting," conspiracy, and sometimes
agency. See generally 5A A. JACORS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE IOn-5, § 40 (rev.
ed. 1990).
161. Section 16(a) and (b); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) & (b) (1988).
162. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). According to the weight of
authority, recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement. See, e.g., Nelson v. Serwold, 576
F.2d 1332, 1336-38 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970:
Although the Supreme Court left undecided the question whether recklessness
is sufficient to support liability under Rule lOb-5, distinguished jurists have long
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As the Supreme Court recognized in Hochfelder

and Huddleston, while defendants may be entitled to protection for negligence or strict liability claims 65 after one or three years, it is appropriate
to impose a longer period of contingent liability on defendants accused of
conduct involving a more culpable mental state, as rule lOb-5 requires.

A person engaged in intentional wrongdoing is in a position to cover
up his wrongdoing until the statute runs. In the garden variety "Ponzi
scheme,"' the malfeasor will induce the victim to invest with promises of

high returns. 167 The malfeasor will create the appearance of generating the

promised return through a return of capital received from the original and
subsequent investors and misdescribed as profits. Because of the malfeasor's
ostensible success, victims will invest additional money and will spread the

considered it so. And since Ernst & Ernst, courts have continued to assess Rule lOb5 liability for reckless behavior.
Id. at 1337.
163. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 186 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Wood v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 345 n.13 (5th
Cir. 1981).
164. See, e.g., In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989);
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040,
1048 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d
234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840. The element of causation in lOb-5 actions
has been described as "a metaphysical concept and its meaning may differ in different contexts
and the linkage between causation and result necessary to satisfy the legal concept is not
always susceptible of direct proof or mathematical determination." Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
165. Such as the express private rights of action under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
166. See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924). In December of 1919, Charles Ponzi,
began spreading the false tale that he was engaged in buying international postal coupons in
foreign countries and selling them in other countries with a 100% profit, an opportunity
allegedly made possible by the excessive differences in the rates of exchange following World
War I. He was willing, he said, to give others the opportunity to share this profit with him.
By a written promise to pay each investor $150 in 90 days for every $100 loaned, he
induced thousands to lend money to him. He stimulated their avidity by paying his 90-day
notes in full at the end of 45 days, and by circulating the notice that he would pay any
unmatured note presented in less than 45 days at 100% of the loan. He began with $150 of
capital and within eight months he took in $9,582,000, for which he issued his notes for
$14,374,000. In reality, however, he made no investments of any kind. All of the money used
to repay investors came from loans by other investors.
167. Ponzi schemes proliferate across the country, defrauding thousands of investors out
of millions of dollars annually. See, e.g., Thousands Reportedly Hit by Ponzi SchemesInvestors Bilked Out of More Than $750 Million, L.A. Times, June 9, 1985, Part V, at 8,
col. 1 ("The nation's state securities administrators say they have found a pattern of 30 major
known or suspected Ponzi schemes in which tens of thousands of Americans were bilked out
of more than $750 million over the past three years. The North American Securities Administrators Assn. and the Council of Better Business Bureaus said the schemes, based in 14
states; appear to have defrauded investors in all 50 states."); Akst, How Barry Minkow Fooled
the Auditors, FosaEs, Oct. 2, 1989, at 126 (discussing ZZZZ Best Company Ponzi scheme in
which Barry Minkow created $200 million house of cards); Stern & Giltenan, "'Norma, Would
IDo Anything to Hurt You?", FoRBEs, June 13, 1988, at 112 (regarding alleged Ponzi schemes
of Florida developer).
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tale of the malfeasor's successes, thereby inducing future victims to provide
additional funds for perpetuating the fraud. So long as investors receive
their promised return they do not suspect any wrongdoing; to the contrary,
they are happy with the "investment." In the classic Ponzi scheme, the
malfeasor pockets all of the invested funds not used to create the phoney
return. 16 With the benefit of a short statute of limitations that begins to
run from the date of the violation, or even sale of the security, the malfeasor
can insulate himself from liability simply by paying the phoney return until
the statute expires.
Numerous variations of the scheme exist. For example, the malfeasor
can make the scheme more sophisticated (and more difficult to detect) by
funneling a portion of the investments into actual business operations which
create a phoney return by using investor funds to cover losses. This latter
type of scheme can be virtually undetectable for an extended period of time
because the investor, upon inquiry, can observe an actual, operating business. Without a scrupulous auditor, however, the investor cannot know
whether, or to what extent, that business is operating successfully.
A similar situation often occurs in connection with defaulted municipal
bond issues, an area of rule lOb-5 securities fraud that may well involve
more damages to investors on a national level than any other.' 69 Construction

168. "Ponzi Schemes," and the endless variations on such schemes, are typical scenarios
giving rise to lOb-5 claims. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1989);
Williams v. California First Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988); First Interstate Bank v.
Chapman & Cutler, 837 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1988); Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.
1987); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Dennis
Greenman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539 (lth Cir. 1987); United States v. Brewer, 807 F.2d 895
(lth Cir. 1987); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale See. Corp., 801 F.2d 13 (2d
Cir. 1986); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Chilcott Portfolio Management, Inc., 713
F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Slocum, 695 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir 1982); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175
(3d Cir. 1981); Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Farris,
614 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1979); Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388 (4th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109
(3d Cir. 1977); SEC v. First Sec. Co., 507 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tellier,
255 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1958).
169. As of September 1988, investors held $720 billion of municipal debt. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 26100, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,326,
at 89,443 (Sept. 22, 1988). Household, rather than institutional, investors account for more
than a third of municipal debt holdings. Id. The SEC, citing the Bond Investors' Association,
has estimated that over 300 municipal issuers have defaulted on over $5 billion in bond
indebtedness. Id. at 89,446 n.29. During the eleven year period from 1972 through 1983, there
were at least 118 defaults, including 82 defaults on private purpose conduit bond issues. Report
of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Regulation of Municipal Securities, [198889 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,325 n. 57 (Sept. 22, 1988). That figure
probably is conservative. See J. Rediker, Duties, Responsibilities, Roles and Civil Liability of
Counsel, Issuers, Underwriters and Indenture Trustees in Bond Default Situations, at 11
(presented at the Practicing Law Institute seminar on The Problems of Indenture Trustees and
Bondholders 1990: Defaulted Bonds and Bankruptcy, Jan. 1990).
A particularly graphic illustration of the enormity of the problem of fraudulently issued
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or acquisition of many facilities has been financed by industrial development
bonds, which often are viewed by the average investor as being "safe"
investments because they are a species of "municipal" bonds. In reality,
such revenue bonds can be more risky than many common stocks because
industrial development revenue bonds are not general obligations of any
governmental body. 70 The principal and interest on such bonds generally is
paid only from the revenue of the financed project, and in a large number
of issues which have defaulted in the last decade, there was little viable
security for the bondholders other than a mortgage on a facility that was
either shut down or operating at a loss. When the proceeds of bond issues

are used to finance the construction or renovation of a project, it is common
to set up "reserve funds," typically lasting eighteen months or sometimes
even longer, to make interest payments during the construction period while

the project is unable to generate its own income. Defrauded investors are
unlikely to discover that there was any problem at all, much less deliberate

fraud, until a scheduled coupon interest payment is missed. Thus, for bond
issues with interest payable semiannually (which is customary), the first
scheduled interest coupon to go unpaid, if the promoters do not put any
money into the till to stave off a default, would be the fourth semiannual
payment, due 24 months after closing of the bond issue. If some funds are
available from other sources, such as a guarantor, the default might not

municipal bonds is presented by the recent troubles of the Washington Public Power Supply
System bonds, the so-called "WPPSS bonds." In the largest municipal bond default, WPPSS
was unable to pay the principal and interest on $2.25 billion of bonds sold to investors to
finance construction of nuclear power facilities. As a part of the financing, certain Washington
utilities agreed to finance more than 68% of the costs of the projects, even though those
utilities would not own the power plants. Although there were indications that those utilities'
agreements might not be binding, bond counsel and others issued unqualified opinions on
their legality. After raising the $2.25 billion estimated to be necessary to build the nuclear
reactors, the Washington Supreme Court held that the utilities' agreements were illegal and
not binding. See Chemical Bank v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 U.S. 1075 (1985); Chemical
Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash.2d 772. 666 P.2d 329 (Wash. 1983),
aff'd on reh'g, 102 Wash.2d 874, 691 P.2d 524 (Wash. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., Haberman
v. Chemical Bank, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985). Accordingly, the bondholders were left without the
primary security for their investments. See generally Staff Report on the Investigation in the
Matter of Transactionsin Washington PublicPower Supply System Securities, [1988-89 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,327. The WPPSS case is a prime example not only of
the extent of municipal bond fraud in the nation, but also the complexities involved that
prevent early detection of fraud.
170. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 26100, [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,326, at 89,443:
Today, however, municipal issues include a greater proportion of revenue bonds
that are not backed by the full faith and credit of a governmental entity and which,
in many cases, may pose greater credit risks to investors.
Id. Although general obligation bonds normally pose fewer risks than revenue bonds because
they are backed by the good faith and credit of the governmental issuer, some such issuers'
credit is not worth very much. For example, general obligation bonds issued by small, special
purpose districts have sometimes defaulted and been the subject of SEC enforcement actions.
See id. at 89,448 n.41.
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occur until three or four years have elapsed. Even after the occurrence of
a default, it is generally weeks or months later before the investor learns
his coupons have "bounced" and he receives notice of the default.
Moreover, the initial notices of default from a bond indenture trustee
do not necessarily put the purchaser on notice that fraud, or anything other
than an unforeseen post-closing economic downturn, occurred. Bondholders
usually must wait some period of time after the notice of default to learn
whether the project will stay open, close, be sold at foreclosure, or be
refinanced, and in general, whether they will have a loss on their investment.
As a result, more than three years often pass after the date of closing a
tax-exempt revenue bond issue before any notice of possible fraud arises.
Thus, in the proliferating area of municipal bond defaults, at least two
factors, bondholder reliance on indenture trustees and capitalized interest
reserve funds, make a one year/three year limitations rule wholly unworkable
and unjust. The use of such reserve funds for "capitalized interest" permits
a situation to exist in which the project financed by the bonds may never
have been feasible, or it might not even be built or put into operation due
to a fraudulent misuse of the bond proceeds, but because there are sufficient
reserves from the offering proceeds and perhaps other short-term sources
of funds to pay the bondholders' regular interest installments for at least
two years, if not more, the bondholders will likely never have a reason to
know of the fraud underlying the issuance of their bonds until after the
one year/three year statute of limitations has expired. Even after the
bondholders learn of a missed interest payment, they may be lulled into
inaction by the indenture trustee's efforts to refinance the project, effect a
workout, or foreclose on the project and avoid or reduce the bondholders'
losses, accompanied by notices listing what is being done on their behalf
but containing no hint that any fraud occurred.
An unscrupulous promoter could further obscure his fraud by utilizing
a debt service reserve fund in a Ponzi scheme. For example, suppose that
a promoter orchestrates the issuance of a series of revenue bond issues with
capitalized interest provisions. If the revenues of the projects financed with
the bond proceeds are commingled for the purpose of forestalling defaults,
many years could pass before investors would have any hint that anything
17
was wrong. '
Although Congress did not anticipate in 1934 that section 10(b) would
be used as a private cause of action, the legislative history of the 1934 Act
nonetheless indicates that the short one year/three year limitations period
was deemed appropriate for the express remedies only in view of the
comparatively light burdens placed on a plaintiff to establish a cause of
171. The September 26, 1989, issue of The Bond Buyer describes a case in which a
developer organized a not-for-profit corporation which was used in connection with $82 million
of revenue bonds sold in twenty-one separate issues over a five year period. Investors alleged
that commingled funds from the projects had been used to keep prior projects afloat. So long
as the promoter was able to keep doing new deals, bondholders from earlier projects continued
,o receive payments.
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action. In response to criticism that it was "manifestly unfair . .. to limit
any damaged party to one year or two years or three years in the bringing
of a suit, because it may sometimes take four or five years to discover that
a fraud has been committed,"'' 2 Senator Austin' stated:
I inquire of the Senator from Kentucky whether he does not
recognize another exceptional circumstance in that the burden of
proof is shifted around on the question of knowledge or willfulness
in a misrepresentation. The committee have put the burden on the
defendant, so that in this case the plaintiff does not have to spend
any time going out and seeking his evidence. All he has to prove
74
is the fact of misrepresentation.
Because of these distinctions in the elements of a cause of action
between both blue sky laws and the express remedies of the 1933 and 1934
Acts and rule lOb-5, there are innumerable claims that may be asserted
under rule lob-5 that might or might not be allowed under those express
remedies. With some exceptions, the express federal remedies and blue sky
laws generally do not provide a cause of action to defrauded sellers; they
do not afford a cause of action for churning or violations of the "know
thy customer" and suitability rules; they do not permit a cause of action
directly against broker-dealers or investment advisers who are not "sellers,"
and there generally is no "aiding and abetting" liability under the blue sky
laws or the express rights of action under the 1933 and 1934 Acts,'7 5 In
addition, states that require proof of reliance to support a claim for damages
generally have not recognized the "fraud on the market,' '1 76 or "fraud

172. 78 CONG. REc. 8201 (1934) (Statement of Senator Barkley).
173. Apparently addressing section 12(2) of the Securities Act.
174. 78 CONG. REc. 8201 (1936). Some commentators have suggested that the legislative
history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts regarding the applicable statute of limitations for the express
civil liability provisions supports the view that Congress "would have imposed a similar policy
of repose on an implied action based upon violation of section 10(b) and the rules adopted
thereunder." Bloomenthal, supra note 12, at 258-62. That contention, however, overlooks
Senator Austin's statement. Moreover, it is impossible to determine from the 1934 legislative
history what limitation period Congress would have chosen for a lOb-5 action, because it
never copsidered that there might be such an implied right of action.
175. See Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir. 1985).
[A] person may be held as an aider and abettor only if some other party has
committed a securities law violation, if the accused party has general awareness that
his role was part of an overall activity that is improper, and if the accused aiderabettor knowingly and substantially assisted the violation.
Id. (quoting SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975)). Although the Supreme Court has refused to consider the availability of aiding and
abetting liability in lOb-5 actions, see, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983), the circuit courts agree both that it exists, and that the above-listed elements are
appropriate. Woods, 765 F.2d at 1009 n.8.
176. The "fraud on the market" doctrine is a method of proving reliance by all investors

in a class action context. See generally Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1990).
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creates the market"' doctrines available to establish reliance in rule lOb-5
claims; nor have they generally recognized the Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
78
or Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.179 presumptions of reliUnited States1
80
ance.
The few cases that have been filed under the express rights of action
compared to the large number of lOb-5 actions filed every year highlights
this difference in their statutes of limitation. Because of the inordinately
short limitation periods for the express provisions, most plaintiffs have been
unable to obtain a remedy under such provisions and instead have filed suit
only under rule lOb-5, often also depending upon equitable tolling to make
their action timely.'"' Such results conflict with the federal policy of encouraging private litigation of rule lOb-5 disputes as an aid to enforcement.
It also illustrates the reality that truly duped investors tend to stay duped
for a long time, and therefore need more than one or three years to
177. The "fraud creates the market," or "fraud on the undeveloped market" doctrine is
a variation on the doctrine as discussed in Basic, 485 U.S. 224, and is used to establish
classwide reliance in cases involving new issues of securities or securities for which there is no
open and developed market. See, e.g., Ross v. Bank South, 885 F.2d 723 (l1th Cir. 1989);
T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Ft. Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981)
(en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Ct.,
549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829; Ockerman v. May Zima & Co.,
[1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,088, at 91,090 (M.D. Tenn. 1988);
Jackson v. First Fed. Sav., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,123 (E.D.
Ark. 1988); Anderson v. Bank of the South, N.A., 118 F.R.D. 147 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Goldwater
v. Alston & Bird, 664 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Il. 1986); Masri v. Wakefield, 106 F.R.D. 322,
324-25 (D. Colo. 1984); Gibb v. Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59, 67-69 (N.D. Tex. 1984);
Greenwald v, Integrated Energy, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 65, 69-71 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Rose v. Arkansas
Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., 562 F.Supp. 1180 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill,
Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1982); Shores v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth.,
[1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,345 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
178. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The Court in Affiliated
Ute held that it is appropriate to presume investors' reliance when their 10b-5 claims are
premised primarily on nondisclosures of material fact. See also, e.g., Competitive Assocs. v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1975); Kohn v.
American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874;
Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. 48, 58-59 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,377
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
179. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). In Mills the Court held that
in a tender offer class action reliance could be presumed upon a showing of materiality where
the alleged misrepresentations are contained in standardized written misrepresentations. See
also, e.g., Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 170 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 960 (1974); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874; Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 F.R.D. 544, 547 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
aff'd, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Schnorbach v. Fuqua,
70 F.R.D. 424 (S.D. Ga. 1975); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 62 F.R.D. 466, 476-77 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
180. The list of distinctions between rule lOb-5 and the express causes of action of both
federal and state securities laws is endless, and is beyond the scope of this article.
181. Legislation Comment, supra note 12, at 1166.
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comprehend that they are victims, and to go through the processes of
investigation and preparation incidental to filing a lawsuit.
Finally, the force of arguments that some amalgamation of the one
year/three year periods should govern implied actions has been diminished
by congressional silence for the forty-four years since a 10b-5 cause of
action was first implied. By the time the Third Circuit in Data Access
decided that Congress intended forty-four years ago that some version of
the one year/three year limitations rule apply to implied actions, all twelve
circuits and the Supreme Court already had rejected that approach in favor
of adoption of state limitations periods. 8 2 Congress has legislated against
the backdrop of those decisions and, as of the date Data Access was
decided, had remained silent. Accordingly, in light of the longstanding
practice of borrowing state law, it generally should have been assumed
"that Congress intends by its silence that [the courts] borrow state law."'8 3
If Congress had been dissatisfied with the courts' use over the last fortyfour years of state limitations periods, it easily could have made the one
year/three year period applicable to the implied causes of action. It did

not.
Ironically, the Third Circuit's effort to promote uniformity has resulted
in even less uniformity and less certainty. Although many courts have
welcomed the idea of adopting a uniform federal statute of limitations for
rule 10b-5 actions, thus avoiding the inevitable litigation over collateral
issues, most, including the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, have not
followed the course taken by the Third Circuit in In re DataAccess 8 4 The
Supreme Court for many years has declined the opportunity to attack the
problem head on. 85 As a result, rather than promoting uniformity and

182. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing traditional rule adopted by
federal courts to apply forum state's limitations period in lOb-5 actions).
183. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1986).
184. See, e.g., Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1990); Roney & Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218
(6th Cir. 1989); Durham v. Business Management Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1988);
Pinney v. Edward D. Jones & Co., Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1419, 1421 (W.D. Ark. 1989); In re
At. Fin. Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 1003, 1009-10 (D. Mass. 1989); Ecodyne
1989) (citing Suslick v. Rothschild
Corp. v. Guthrie N. Am., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Ill.
Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1984)); Huang v. Sentinel Gov't Sec., 709 F. Supp.
1290, 1301 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Mclnnis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 706 F.
Supp. 1355, 1357 n.5 (M.D. Tenn. 1989); Eickhorst v. American Completion and Dev. Corp.,
706 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Metropolitan Sec. v. Occidental Petroleum, 705 F. Supp.
134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Professional Fin. Management, Ltd., 703 F. Supp. 1388,
1392-93 (D. Minn. 1989); Schoch v. Dade City Retirement Hous., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,341 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Marchese v. Nelson, 700 F. Supp. 522, 524
(D. Utah 1988); Walker v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,955 (E.D. Ill. 1988).
185. The Supreme Court has refused to review the circuits' divergent views of what, if
any, statute of limitations should be applied to rule lOb-5 actions. For example, in 1976, the
Sixth Circuit applied the forum state's general fraud limitations period, and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976),
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certainty, Data Access has created new uncertainties as litigants are forced
to relitigate what may already have been settled issues in their circuit, and
unless the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits do an about-face, a split will
remain. Only the Supreme Court can obviate the problem, for if the courts
of appeals initiate their own efforts to change the method of borrowing a
limitations period for lOb-5 actions that has been used for over forty years,
only more confusion and less certainty will result. If district courts try to
change the law, there will be a lack of uniformity not only among the
circuits, but within them as well.
Ti

INSIDER TRADING AND

SECuliTis FR UD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988

Despite the advantages of a uniform limitations period for lOb-5 actions,
DataAccess has not been followed by most courts because it failed to apply
a federal statute which "clearly provides a closer analogy" than available
state alternatives; nor is its creation of the one year/three year rule "more
appropriate" than the period set out in state law. Those requirements may
be satisfied, however, by a statute of limitations added to the 1934 Act
after the Data Access decision by the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988.116 Section 5 of ITSFEA amended the 1934 Act
by adding section 20A, a limitations period that expressly is applicable to
certain actions brought under the auspices of rule 10b-5.187 Section 20A of
the 1934 Act provides "a federal statute of limitations actually designed to
accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake here-a
statute that is, in fact, an analogy [to lOb-5] more apt than any of the
suggested state-law parallels""' because it is consistent with the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in Hochfelder and Huddleston.
Congress enacted ITSFEA in November of 1988 to "augment enforcement of the securities laws, particularly in the area of insider trading .... "I'll
ITSFEA provides: (1) civil penalties against persons who trade securities
while in possession of material, non-public information or who communicate

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). The next year, the Fifth Circuit adopted the forum state's
blue sky limitations period, and the Court again refused review. Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander
Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977). Most recently,
the Court refused to review the DataAccess opinion, in which the Third Circuit, relying upon
the recent line of Supreme Court cases, held that the Court's new way of thinking mandated
a change in the law in favor of adoption of an analogous federal limitations period. In re
Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131.
186. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No 100704, 102 Stat. 4680 (1988) [hereinafter ITSFEA].
187. ITSFEA § 5, 102 Stat. 4680 (1988) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78t-1).
188. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983).
189. HousE REPORT, supra note 157, at 7; see also Kaswell, An Insider's View of the
Insider Trading and Securities FraudEnforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAw. 145, 157 (1989).
Congress reasoned that rules and regulations governing securities trading by persons in
possession of "material nonpublic information" are in the public interest and necessary to
protect investors. It found that despite the SEC's enforcement efforts, additional methods to
deter and prosecute violations of SEC rules and regulations were appropriate. ITSFEA § 2.
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material, non-public information in connection with trades effected on or
through the facilities of a national securities exchange;1'9 (2) an affirmative
statutory requirement for broker-dealers and investment advisors to establish, maintain and enforce written supervisory procedures to prevent the
misuse of material, non-public information;' 9' (3) a "bounty provision"
allowing the SEC to award payments to persons providing information
about insider trading violations; 192 (4) increases in criminal penalties;' 93 (5)
an express cause of action for those who traded the same class of securities
"contemporaneously" with, and on the opposite side of the market from,
the insider trader; 94 (7) authorization for the SEC to cooperate with foreign
governmental authorities in international investigations; 95 and (8) that the
SEC must study the adequacy of present securities laws to meet their goal
of protecting investors.' 9 6
The Act contains no definition of "insider trading." In considering the
bill, the Committee decided "not to alter the substantive law with respect

190. ITSFEA § 3(a)(2). The Act gives the court discretion to impose penalties of up to
three times the profit gained or loss avoided against traders, aiders and abettors and controlling
persons. See ITSFEA §§ 3 & 5. Penalties imposed in actions brought by the Commission
under ITSFEA are payable to the Treasury of the United States. 1934 Act § 20A(b) (as
amended by ITSFEA). In actions brought by contemporaneous traders, the total amount of
damages recovered cannot exceed the profit gained or loss avoided in the transactions that are
the subject of the violation. 1934 Act § 20A(b) (as amended by ITSFEA). The total amount
of damages imposed on any one person in a contemporaneous trader action is diminished by
any amounts disgorged in an action brought by the Commission under ITSFEA.
191. ITSFEA § 3(b) (amending § 15 of 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1988), by adding new
subsection (f)).
192. ITSFEA § 3(a) (amending 1934 Act by adding § 21A(e), allowing SEC to pay up to
10% of penalties received from violators to informants).
193. ITSFEA § 4.
194. ITSFEA § 5 (amending 1934 Act by adding § 20A), which states:
Any person who violates any provision of this title or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction
to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that
is the subject of such violation, has purchased (where such violation is based on a
sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based on a purchase of securities)
securities of the same class.
Section 5 also authorizes the Commission to promulgate rules and regulations
it considers necessary to further public interests or to protect investors and to bring
actions against.
Id.; see also ITSFEA § 5 (amending 1934 Act by adding § 20A(a)(l)(A) (authorizing Commission
to bring actions) and § 20A(c) (authority to promulgate rules)).
195. ITSFEA §§ 6 & 8.
196. ITSFEA § 7. Congress found that since the last comprehensive review of the federal
securities laws, rules, and regulations, the volume and nature of securities transactions and
the nature of the securities industry had changed dramatically. ITSFEA § 7(a). The advent of
the modern international, institutionalized securities market prompted Congress to direct the
Commission to "make a study and investigation of the adequacy of the Federal Securities
laws and rules and regulations thereunder for the protection of the public interest and the
interests of investors." ITSFEA § 7(b).
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to insider trading."' 97 The express private right of action on behalf of
contemporaneous traders was designed to codify existing implied private
rights of action based on insider trading and to clarify the law regarding
the duty of noninsiders by adopting the "misappropriation theory.' ' 98 The
civil liability provisions of the Act are intended to dovetail with existing
private implied rights of action. The House Committee that reported on

the bill considered a provision that contained an express cause of action
for persons other than contemporaneous traders.' 99 That provision arose
out of a concern about the effects of insider trading on tender offers. 2°°
The Committee reported the bill to the House without the provision

to avoid creating an express private cause of action which might
have the unintended effect of freezing the law or in any way
restricting the potential rights of action which may have been implied
by courts in this area. Rather, the Committee wanted to give the

courts leeway to develop such implied private rights of action in an
expansive fashion in the future. 2°'
The limitations period for contemporaneous trader actions is "5 years
22
after the date of the last transaction that is the subject of the violation." 0
The statute of limitations in section 20A clearly provides both a "closer
analogy" and a "more appropriate" limitations period than is provided by
state law or the one year provisions of the federal statutes.

The touchstone of statutory interpretation is, of course, congressional
intent. Courts should attempt to determine what limitations period Congress
intended to apply to 10b-5 actions. 203 When Congress enacted the one year
197. Housa REPORT, supra note 157, at 11. The Report cites Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980), and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), for the proposition that there
is no "general duty" to disclose material nonpublic information before trading. The Report
goes on to state that "insiders" and others having a relationship to the issuer do have a duty
and that, in the view of the Committee, a person who misappropriates nonpublic information
from sources other than market participants also has a duty based on the "misappropriation
theory." HousE REPORT, supra note 157, at 10 (citing United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d
1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)). The Act is intended to "overturn court cases
which have precluded recovery for plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is premised upon
the misappropriation theory." Id. at 11 (citing Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1983)).
While Congress appears to cling to the notion that merely using nonpublic information is
not per se "insider trading," it has not limited the duty to those who have some relationship
to the issuer. It has sought to proscribe trading on nonpublic information obtained by
"misappropriation" from sources other than market participants. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at
1031; Aldave, Misappropriation:A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic
Information, 13 HorsTRA L. REV. 101 (1984).
198. See generally Aldave, supra note 197.
199. See Kaswell, supra note 189, at 167-68.
200. Id.
201. HousE REPORT, supra note 157, at 27.
202. 1934 Act § 20A(b)(4) (as amended by ITSFEA).
203. See, e.g., In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1546-47 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 131; Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, 788
F.2d 1500, 1503 (l1th Cir. 1986).
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statute of limitations in 1934 for certain strict liability and negligence-based
claims, it could not have "intended" for that same limitations period to
apply to 10b-5 actions since the implied right of action under section 10(b)
did not yet exist; indeed, the legislative history of the 1934 Act does not
indicate that Congress even considered the possibility of implied actions
under section 10(b). 204 Congress enacted ITSFEA, on the other hand, against
the backdrop of numerous judicial decisions construing 10b-5 claims. Its
legislative history acknowledges that private 10b-5 claims "have traditionally
served as an important supplement to the Commission's enforcement of
federal securities laws" 20 5 and that Congress intended to give the courts
leeway to develop such implied private rights of action "in an expansive
fashion in the future."20
In determining whether Congress "intended" for lOb-5 actions to be
governed by the one year statute enacted in 1934 or the five year statute
enacted in 1988, Congress' expressed intent to encourage the courts to
develop 10b-5 actions in an "expansive fashion in the future," coupled with
the fact that 10b-5 actions did not even exist in 1934, would seem dispositive.
To the extent the Congress "intended" for either period to control, it could
only have intended to apply the five year statute of ITSFEA.
The Committee Report also indicates that the express liability provisions
of ITSFEA were designed to work hand-in-hand with implied private causes
of action under 10b-5. It contemplates that various private causes of action
for injuries caused by insider trading should be implied outside the "contemporaneous trader" situation. As an example of an implied cause of
action in the insider trading concept, the Report points to Anheuser-Busch
Companies, Inc. v. Thayer,207 in which a tipper disclosed the plaintiff's
intent to acquire another corporation, thereby pushing up the price of the
stock by insider trading, allegedly increasing the tender offer price by $80
million. The Report recognized that Anheuser-Busch, the plaintiff in the
case, was not a "contemporaneous trader," for whom an express cause of
action would have existed under the 1934 Act. It concluded, however, that
an implied 10b-5 cause of action should exist on Anheuser-Busch's behalf
but wished to clarify in ITSFEA what sorts of insider trading would
constitute a violation of rule 10b-5.20s
The close relationship between express and implied causes of action
under section 10(b) of the amended 1934 Act evidences Congress' intent to
impose a five year statute of limitations on 10b-5 claims. Congress contemplated that a situation like the one described in the Committee Report
would give rise to both implied and express causes of action. The House
204. See Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1547 (citing Note, Implied Liability Under The Securities
Exchange Act, 61 HAxv. L. REv. 858, 861 (1948)); A. BROmEERG, SEcuIUTIxs LAW: FRAuDSEC RusL 1013-5, § 2.2(300)-(340)(1968); S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934).
205. HousE REPORT, supra note 157, at 26.
206. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).

207. No. CA3-85-0794-R (N.D. Texas 1986).
208. HousE REPORT, supra note 157, at 28.
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Committee reporting on the bill went to great lengths to point out that a
company in the position of Anheuser-Busch would be entitled to damages
in an implied action far in excess of the damages provided under the Act.
Presumably, contemporaneous traders would be entitled to damages as well.
It is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended two different statutes
of limitation to govern an action by two plaintiffs against a single defendant
for the same cause of action arising out of the same series of events.
In view of this development, there would seem to be no adequate
textual, historical, or policy justification for the Supreme Court to prefer
a limitations system enacted by Congress half a century ago, with certain
delimited rights of action in mind, over the traditional method of adopting
state statutes, or certainly over a limitations period that Congress so recently
enacted with full knowledge of the nature of claims under section 10(b).
The limitations period in ITSFEA clearly provides a "closer analogy" than
available state alternatives or other federal securities law alternatives.
The ITSFEA five year limitations period also supplies a "more appropriate" limitations period for lOb-5 actions than either state law analogies
or the one year period applicable to the more restricted express causes of
action. The 1934 Act has a broad remedial purpose of affording protection
and relief to defrauded investors. 209 That legislative purpose of facilitating
an effective remedy for defrauded investors is frustrated by undue litigation
on the collateral question of what statute of limitations is most appropriate
for the sorts of claims made, 21 0 and most certainly, by unduly short
limitations periods. The purpose of statutes of limitation supposedly is to
add certainty, but if litigants must always litigate the issue of what limitations period is most applicable to the claims as they have been pleaded,
there is no certainty at all.
Like RICO, which was at issue in Malley-Duff, and section 1983, which
was at issue in Wilson v. Garcia, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 "encompass
numerous and diverse topics and subtopics" 211 and therefore may be analogized to a number of state law claims, including common law fraud,
breach of contract, professional malpractice, conversion, breach of fiduciary
duty, misappropriation, and violations of blue sky laws and licensing
requirements, among others. Under these circumstances, uniform characterization "is required to avoid intolerable 'uncertainty and time-consuming
litigation ' ' 21 2 inimical to the purposes underlying the federal securities laws.
The Court's reasons in Malley-Duff for adopting a federal limitations
period for civil RICO claims are enlightening, and should provide needed
guidance in this murky area of law. After recognizing the real world
inefficiencies caused by the fact that plaintiffs would be denied their remedy

209. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983).
210. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
211. In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1551, 1543 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
212. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987) (quoting
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985)).
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if they "wrongly postulate" what limitations period will be applied by some
court in the future, and that defendants cannot determine their potential
liabilities without "knowing with confidence when their delicts lie in repose, "213 the Court noted five specific factors making adoption of an
analogous federal limitations rule "more appropriate" than state analogies.
First, civil RICO was patterned on the federal Clayton Act and relevant
portions of the two acts are virtually identical. 214 Second, both the RICO
and Clayton Acts "are designed to remedy economic injury by providing
for the recovery of treble damages, costs and attorney's fees. ' 21 1 Third,
both acts depend upon private enforcement to handle "a serious national
' '21 6
problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate.
Fourth, both acts address the "same type of injury" in that the plaintiff
must be injured in his "business or property. '21 7 Fifth, the legislative history
2 s
indicated an intent to pattern RICO on the Clayton Act.
These same factors point to adoption of the five year limitations period
of ITSFEA. As with RICO, generally there is no adequate state law analogy
to rule lOb-5. As to common law fraud, the Supreme Court has observed
that common law fraud doctrines were developed in contexts "light years
away from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule lOb-5 is
applicable.' '219 One of Congress's paramount objectives in enacting section
10(b) was to "rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common law
protections by establishing higher standards of conduct. ' 220 In essence, the
1933 and 1934 Acts together replaced the doctrine of caveat emptor with
one of "Seller Beware." Thus, "[a]ctions under rule lOb-5 are distinct from
common-law deceit and misrepresentation claims . .. and are in part designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law. ' ' 22'
Given these recognized differences, common-law fraud fails to provide a
close analogy to claims under section 10(b), and the limitations period
governing common-law fraud claims therefore reflects only a crude approximation of the appropriate balance of competing interests at stake in a
section 10(b) case.
The same can be said for state blue sky limitations periods. For example,
section 410(a)(l) of the Uniform Securities Act, which has been adopted in
some form by most states, provides an express private right of action similar
to section 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 771(2).222 This civil cause

213. Id. at 150.
214. Id. at 150-51.
215. Id. at 151.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975).
220. Herman & Mclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983).
221. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 n.22; see also 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note
158, § 11.01.
222. See, e.g., Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1988).
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of action, unlike section 10(b),223 does not require proof of reliance- 4 ,
causation-, or scienter. 226 In addition, like sections 12(2) and 11 of the
1933 Act, the civil cause of action in section 410 of the Uniform Securities
Act restricts the range of persons who may be held liable, making it quite
dissimilar from section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
On the other hand, the five year period in ITSFEA would afford the
"proper balance' 227 between the legitimate interests of investors and potential defendants and the practicalities of litigation make application of a
limitations period drawn from section 20A for implied claims under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 "more appropriate" than other alternatives. The same
considerations that compel uniform characterization of these claims in the
first instance negate any reasonable argument that one type of claim under
section 10(b) should be governed by the five year period while others should
be governed by different periods. In many cases, there may be no difficulty
in distinguishing between an insider trading claim and some other types of
rule lOb-5 claims. In other cases, however, the parties readily could recast
a claim as either one or the other. If one sort of action is governed by
section 20A(b)(4)'s limitations period, while another is limited differently,
parties will have an incentive to engage in "artful pleading" in the hopes
of "persuad[ing] the court that the facts and legal theories of a particular
2
... claim" fall under whichever period of limitations is longer. M
Five years is not an unreasonable length of time for a potential defendant
to wait before knowing that the statute of limitations has run on any
potential claims against him. 229 The sale of securities is known to be a highly

223. Scienter is a requirement of a lOb-5 action based on insider trading. See e.g., Dirks
v.SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1980).
224. The Draftsmens' Commentary to § 410 of the Uniform Securities Act states:
The "by means of" clause in line 8 is not intended as a requirement that the buyer
prove reliance on the untrue statement or omission.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also 12 J. LONG, supra note 43, § 1.0414][b], at 1-17.
225. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Rousseff, 537 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1989); Lynch v. Cook, 196
Cal. Rptr. 544, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1072 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C.
6, 249 S.E.2d 486 (1978); Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 67 Cal. App. 3d 705
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977); 12 J. LONG, supra note 43, § 1.04[41[b], at 1-17.
226. Rousseff v. Dean, Witter & Co., 453 F. Supp. 774, 779 (N.D. Ind. 1978); Sprangers
v. Interactive Technologies, Inc., 394 N.W.2d 498, 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Kittilson v.
Ford, 93 Wa. 2d 223, 608 P.2d 264 (1980); Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486

(1978).
227. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171 (1983) (quoting
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1981) (Stewart, J. concurring)).
228. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239 (1989).
229. Section 20A does not state on its face whether the statute is tolled until the plaintiff
has constructive notice of the fraud. The Seventh Circuit in Short v. Belleville Shoe Manufacturing Co., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,379 (7th Cir. July 30, 1990), opined
that the general equitable tolling doctrine will be applicable to the limitations period in § 20A.
The tolling issue not withstanding, equitable estoppel should prevent the defendant from
asserting the statute of limitations where the defendant has been guity of active concealment
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regulated industry. Entering into that field carries with it certain risks, and
considering the billions of dollars that are invested in the markets each

year, it is not unreasonable to require that promoters of securities be held
responsible for their misdeeds for a length of time sufficient to allow the
injured parties to discover the fraud.
Finally, there should be no concern that a five year limitations period
will "open the floodgates" of lOb-5 litigation. Filings of securities fraud
class actions have declined sharply over the last decade.230 Moreover, adoption of ITSFEA's five-year rule would reduce much of the burden now

placed on federal courts by eliminating collateral litigation on issues of
tolling and discovery.
Because ITSFEA was enacted recently, few courts have had the opportunity to address the applicability of its five year limitation period to other

lOb-5 causes of action under the 1934 Act. The plaintiffs in Elysian Federal
Savings v. FirstInterregionalEquity' and Ceres Partnersv. GEL Associateso2

argued that the five year limitations period found in ITSFEA is the most
closely analogous limitations period for all lOb-5 actions and urged its
adoption as a general limitations period for 10b-5 claims. The SEC also
has urged this view in amicus briefs filed before the Second Circuit in the
appeal of Ceres and before the United States Supreme Court in Lebman v.
Aktiebolaget Electrolux. 2 3 Though both district courts were unpersuaded
by the plaintiff's arguments, the courts' criticisms were less than compelling.
Both courts opined that the five year ITSFEA limitations period is not
analogous to 10b-5 actions generally because ITSFEA only applies to insider

trading. But after rejecting ITSFEA on the grounds that it applies only to
certain lOb-5 actions, both courts adopted limitations periods from other
express civil liability provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 that apply to
even fewer lOb-5 actions.
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit in Short v. Belleville Shoe Manufacturing Company-R4 adopted the reasoning of Data Access and refused to

of the fraud.
In Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1055 (2d Cir. 1969), for example, the
Second Circuit in an opinion by Judge Friendly, a rather prescient observer of the securities
laws, held that the three year limitations period of section 13 of the 1933 Act was no bar to
a claim for the sale of unregistered securities because during the time before and after the
sale, the defendant had been assuring the plaintiff "that the issue was at the SEC." See also,
e.g., Eaton v. Coal Par of West Virginia, Inc., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 99,675 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (section 12(1)); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336
F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971) (§ 12(1)). Similarly, Justice Black held in Glus v. Brooklyn E.
Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-34 (1959), that the principle that no man should be allowed
to take advantage of his own wrong "has frequently been employed to bar inequitable reliance
on statutes of limitations." Id.
230. Filings of securities fraud class actions have dropped by over 50% since the early
1970s. Whereas 305 such actions were filed in federal courts in 1974, only 118 were filed in
1989. Class Action Reports, at 316 (July-August 1989).
231. 713 F. Supp. 737, 742 (D.N.J. 1989).
232. 714 F. Supp. 679, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
233. 854 F.2d 1319 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3214 (1989).
234. [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,379 (7th Cir. July 30, 1990).
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adopt ITSFEA's limitations period for all 10b-5 actions. 2 5 In an opinion
authored by Judge Easterbrook, the Short court described the choice between
' 6
section 13 of the 1933 Act and section 20A of ITSFEA as "difficult." 2 It

conceded that ITSFEA represents Congress' "latest thoughts" on the issue
of a statute of limitations for securities fraud, but chose section 13: (i)
because adopting a rule in accordance with the Third Circuit's Data Access

opinion would promote uniformity and (ii) because of Judge Easterbrook's
view that a five year statute of limitation that allows for tolling is too long.

237
The plaintiff in Short intends to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari
and given the uncertain state of the law caused by the Third and Seventh
Circuit's departure from established practice, the Court should no longer
shy from this issue. The Court should grant certiorari.
If the Supreme Court grants certiorari in Short, the first of the Seventh
Circuit's two grounds for rejecting section 20A's limitations period, conformity with the Third Circuit, should not be a consideration. Uniformity
by itself is no substitute for congressional intent. It is anomalous to choose
Data Access over ITSFEA when Data Access preceded Congress' "latest
thoughts" on the issue. Moreover, if the Supreme Court adopts the limitations period in section 20A, the Court will do more to promote uniformity
than if the Court adopts section 13 of the 1933 Act. The Seventh and Third
Circuit's approach creates less uniformity in lOb-5 actions because the one
year/three year rule of Data Access will govern some 10b-5 claims. On the
other hand, the ITSFEA limitations period will govern claims that can be
pleaded as insider trading actions. Many "garden variety" lOb-5 claims,
including practically all issuer transactions, involve sales by persons who
can be described as "insiders," and most, if not all, fraud actions involve
contentions that the defendant withheld "material, nonpublic information,"
i.e., the truth. Accordingly, under the Seventh Circuit's new approach, the
longer statute of limitations under ITSFEA will invite plaintiffs' lawyers to
cast their claims as ITSFEA claims and thereby create additional uncertainties as to which limitations period to apply.
The second part of the Seventh Circuit's rationale in Short represents
judicial activism at its most dangerous and egregious. Judge Easterbrook
opined that although section 20A may represent Congress's "latest thoughts"
on the limitations issue, five years is too long a period to allow defrauded
investors because "[p]rudent investors almost always can sniff out fraud
(or enough smoke to justify litigation) within three years. Section 13 cuts
off only the claims of the most trusting or somnolent . .. '238 Judge
Easterbrook also stated his preference for a statute of repose rather than

235. See Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987). In Norris, a case preceding
Data Access, Judge Easterbrook decried the longstanding practice of adopting state limitations
periods, but was not presented with any authority allowing him to depart from the traditional
rule.
236. Short, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,855.
237. Telephone call to plaintiff's counsel, Robert A. Useted, August 14, 1990.
238. Short, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,856.
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an ordinary limitations period on the theory that in the absence of a repose,
an investor may sell securities and "gamble with other people's money. ' 239
Judge Easterbrook's views would be more appropriate in a petition to
his elected representatives than in a judicial opinion. The opinion abandons
its legitimate intellectual undertaking, an attempt to divine congressional
intent, in favor of the imposition of the judges' personal predilections. The
Court's contention that ITSFEA allows investors to gamble for five years
with others' money is incredible. Does Judge Easterbrook seriously contend
that the securities laws now existing in the Seventh Circuit allow investors
to gamble even for three years with other people's money? Many, if not
most lOb-5 actions are brought to recover damages for the sale of worthless
securities. Investors have no motivation to wait to bring suit if they are
defrauded. Regardless of the limitations period, plaintiffs in lOb-5 actions
do not have an automatic "put" or "call" option-to win their case they
must prove scienter, something akin to deliberate or severely reckless fraud.
Nor is there any basis for the empirical contention that prudent investors
can almost always find fraud in three years. As discussed in considerable
detail earlier in this article, malfeasors routinely structure their schemes to
return to the investor capital disguised as "profits" in order to lull investors
for considerable lengths of time. Indeed, in the Short case, the plaintiff
pleaded that the defendants' fraud had been purposefully concealed from
her through the defendants' deliberate misrepresentations over a course of
twelve years.
Even if Judge Easterbrook is correct in his contention that a one year/
three year rule only cuts off the claims of "the most trusting," that hardly
militates in favor of adoption of such a rule in light of lOb-5's scienter
requirement. The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Short reflects a judicial
attitude of "buyer beware," the antiquated view that the 1934 Act was
designed to redress. To leave the most trusting and naive without a remedy
at the hands of the most unscrupulous and deceitful turns the statute into
a mockery of justice. After all, the purpose of the securities acts is to
protect investors,= and naive investors have always been accorded protection
under the statutes.24
The Short decision merely underscores the need for the United States
Supreme Court to decide the issue. Only then can a rule be adopted that
will truly promote uniformity among the circuits.
CONCLUSION

In determining what limitations period should be applied to implied
rights of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, courts should look to
239. Id. at 96,856.
240. See, e.g., Wilco v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,
346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
241. See, e.g., Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (2d Cir. 1949); SEC v.

Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.
1977).

1990]

PRIVATE lob-5 ACTIONS

585

the most analogous period of limitations, regardless of which legislature
wrote the statute of limitations. Although the traditional rule of looking to
state law to supply a limitations period has in the past added enormous
complications to what should be a simple determination, it nonetheless was
appropriate to look to state limitations because the federal alternative, the
sundry one year/three year federal periods for the express civil liability
sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, was no more analogous to section 10(b)
than similar state laws and did not further the goals and policies of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. With the enactment of a five year limitations period
in connection with the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988, there now exists a federal limitations period that is more
analogous than any other state or federal period and which reflects Congress'
balance of plaintiffs' needs for sufficient time to discover violations of rule
10b-5 with defendants' desire for repose. The Supreme Court now has the
flexibility to, and should, adopt this five year limitations period for all rule
lOb-5 actions.

